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Abstract
In this dissertation, I present two essays linked by their focus on forces that act
on young people as they prepare to enter adulthood and their economically indepen-
dent life. In the first, I investigate the impact of parents’ location and occupational
attributes on young adult children’s labor market outcomes, particularly wages. I
exploit the genealogical structure of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
to measure locations, occupations and wages of young adults and their parents. I
find that college graduates who live near their parents have lower wages than those
who do not, but that wages for high school graduates are not strongly correlated
with proximity to parents. In order to determine the reasons for these patterns, I
build and estimate a model of young adults’ location and occupation decisions to
account for potentially competing effects parents may have on their childrens wages.
Using the model, I find evidence that young adults have strong preferences for living
near parents, a result which through compensating differentials can partially account
for the tendency to earn lower wages when near parents. However, I estimate that
young people across all levels of educational attainment place similar value on this
proximity. I also find that living near parents may directly enhance productivity
and/or occupation quality and lead to higher wages. In particular, I find that high
school graduates whose fathers are in cognitive skill-intense occupations have higher
wages within and occupation and switch into more cognitive skill-intense occupations
themselves if they live in the same labor market as their father, but that this effect
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is not present for college graduates. I also find a differential selection in the earnings
potential of movers and differential impacts of the cost of occupational switching
between high school and college graduates. These differences all substantially con-
tribute to the differences in wage and location choice patterns between high school
and college graduates.
In the second, I present joint work with V. Joseph Hotz, Peter Arcidiacono and
Esteban Aucejo on college admissions in the University of California system. Col-
lege graduation is an important outcome for future welfare, and in this chapter we
examine possible causes for an increase in college graduations among UC students
who enrolled in 1998-2000 versus those who had enrolled in the previous three years.
In between these cohorts, Proposition 209 banned using racial preferences in admis-
sions at California’s public colleges. We analyze unique data for all applicants and
enrollees within the University of California (UC) system before and after Prop 209.
After Prop 209, graduation rates of minorities increased by 4.4%. We characterize
conditions required for better matching of students to campuses to account for this
increase. We find that Prop 209 did improve matching and this improvement was
important for the graduation gains experienced by less-prepared students. At the
same time, better matching only explains about 20% of the overall graduation rate
increase. Changes after Prop 209 in the selectivity of enrolled students explains 34-
50% of the increase. Finally, it appears UC campuses responded to Prop 209 by
doing more to help retain and graduate its students, which explains between 30-46%
of the post-Prop 209 improvement in the graduation rate of minorities.
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1Introduction
The body of this dissertation consists of two separate essays about economic
outcomes of young adults. In the first, I analyze the evolution of young men’s wages,
occupations, and location decisions from the the beginning of adulthood into their
mid-thirties. I am particularly interested in the effects parents have on their sons’
decisions and how those effects differ by characteristics of both parents and sons.
First, I establish correlations in data from the PSID that high school graduates
who live in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as their parents tend to
have slightly higher wages than those who do not, but college graduates in the same
MSA as their parents tend to have lower wages. I hypothesize that these effects
are a combination of a preference to live near parents, which would cause accepted
wages near parents to be lower than otherwise, and a network effect parents may
have on their young adult children in the local labor market, which would have a
positive effect. Both of these effects have a basis in the economic literature, but
it is uncommon for both to be encompassed in one model. I set forth a model to
investigate these relative value of these effects and their contribution to wages and
occupations for young men in each education group.
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I find that both high school and college graduates place large non-monetary value
on living near parents. Furthermore, I find that high school graduates whose fathers
have occupations requiring high cognitive skill tend to receive higher wages and
move into more cognitive skill-intense occupations themselves when living near those
fathers, but this effect does not exist for college graduates. I find that this difference,
along with costs of switching occupations and differential selection of movers, help
explain the different wage patterns by location for high school and college graduates.
In that essay, I begin my analysis after education has been completed. While I
am making a comparison across education groups, which is an important element
of my study, I am taking as given an individual’s educational achievement. The
second essay, in contrast, focuses on college students’ outcomes and takes college
graduation as the specific outcome of interest. In this chapter, my co-authors V.
Joseph Hotz, Peter Arcidiacono, Esteban Aucejo and I examine graduation rates at
University of California (UC) campuses for the 1995-2000 entering classes. During
this time period, California passed Proposition 209, banning the use of race in ad-
missions decisions. After Prop 209, graduation rates of minorities increased by 4.4%.
Using data for all applicants and enrollees within the University of California (UC)
system before and after Prop 209, we examine the reasons for this gain. Because
we have information on all eight UC campuses from this time period, with each
student’s application, admission and matriculation decisions by campus, we are able
to test the mismatch hypothesis, which suggests that affirmative action may place
minority students in universities that do not provide them with the highest proba-
bility of succeeding (by our measure, graduating within five years). We characterize
conditions required for better matching of students to campuses to account for this
increase and present evidence that different UC campuses have a comparative ad-
vantage at graduating students at differing levels of academic preparation, meaning
that mismatch is a theoretical possibility. In practice, we find that Prop 209 did
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improve matching and this improvement was important for the graduation gains ex-
perienced by less-prepared students. However, better matching only explains about
20% of the overall graduation rate increase, and does not explain graduation gains
that were seen among highly prepared students, for whom matching did not greatly
affect graduation outcomes after Prop 209. We find that after Prop 209, there was
an increase in the average preparation of minority students who ultimately enrolled
at UC campuses, and the changes in selectivity of students explain 34-50% of the
increase. Finally, it appears UC campuses responded to Prop 209 by doing more to
help retain and graduate its students, which explains the remaining post-Prop 209
improvement in the graduation rate of minorities.
3
2Parental Influence on Labor Market Outcomes and
Location Decisions of Young Workers
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that parents play a large role in shaping all kinds of their chil-
dren’s later life outcomes. There has been extensive research on human capital
development of children, in which parents are known to play a large role1. There is
less study and certainly less consensus on the direct effects parents have on adult
children. It is precisely because of the all-encompassing nature of parental involve-
ment that it can be difficult to determine the full set of mechanisms by which parents
affect their grown children. In addition to the parental investment in their children
in earlier years, parents and children naturally tend to be similar in many observable
and unobservable ways. In this paper, I look at parental influences on children’s
wages that can be attributed directly to contemporaneous factors when parents and
adult children live near one another, taking childhood investments and other trans-
mission of human capital before coming of age as given. I am interested in what
1 For instance, Heckman (1999) and Almond and Currie (2011) are two of many works by these
and other co-authors concerning early development of human capital
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types of effects living near parents may have, and in particular whether these effects
are different for different types of people.
In the United States, many young people continue to live in the same city where
they grew up and where their parents still live even after establishing their own
household. Using state-level data from the last three decades, Malloy et al. (2011)
document that annual interstate move rates are around 4 percent for young adults
and that over two-thirds of the US population lives in the same state where they
were born. I show similar patterns from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics in
Table 2.1, which I will discuss further in the next section of the paper. The propen-
sity to live near is partially due to the relative scarcity of long-distance moves, but
even a substantial percentage of those who do move away eventually come back.
One common explanation is that this represents a tension between family and labor
market factors: a young person may move away early in their career and settle down
back home later in life. However, there is also an economic literature on the value of
informal networks in the labor market. In this case, there is no tension between these
factors: low mobility could be explained by the desire to stay in the home network,
especially if there were also preference-based reasons to stay.
I am interested in measuring the how the value of parents to adult children
manifests in these two potentially competing effects. Family ties between children
and parents may cause children to accept lower wages in order to live near their
parents than they could earn if they were willing to move across locations. On the
other hand, parents may help children find better jobs than they would be able to
get otherwise if they live in the same location. Therefore, since there are factors
working in each direction, proximity to parents has an ambiguous effect on adult
children’s wages. Indeed, I note that in the unadjusted data, high school graduates
in the same location as their parents tend to have somewhat higher wages as those in
other locations, but college graduates’ wages are significantly lower when in the same
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location as parents. My goal in the paper is to formulate and estimate a model that
can separately identify different channels through which parents can affect children’s
wages, and use the model to shed light on the relative importance of these channels
and how their effects differ by education to produce the result that I find in the
unadjusted data.
In order to determine the relative importance of these effects, I will use the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and build a dynamic structural model draw-
ing from literatures in internal migration, occupational choice and intergenerational
transmission of economic variables. Using the model, I find that young men of any
educational background place large utility values on living near parents and that
high school graduates have significant wage benefits from locating near fathers who
work in occupations requiring high cognitive ability.
Finally, I examine wages and migration rates under various counterfactual scenar-
ios to determine the relative importance of the channels in my model and how they
inform the differential results I find by education. The beneficial effect of fathers in
high cognitive occupations mentioned in the previous paragraph is only one reason
high school and college graduates’ wage patterns differ by proximity to parents. I
also find that college-educated “location movers” are more likely to be of relatively
high ability compared to “location stayers” than high school location movers, and
that lower occupation switching costs for high school graduates also make living near
parents more beneficial. Separately, I also show that the utility value of living near
parents causes move rates to be only about two-thirds of what it would be in the
absence of any preference for family.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I provide more background
on what is known from the literature about internal migration, wages, and family
factors, as well as intergenerational correlations of occupation and other economic
outcomes. In Section 2.3, I explain my dataset and provide descriptive evidence that
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parental characteristics have different patterns of influence on their sons’ outcomes
depending on where they live in relation to one another. In Section 2.4, I lay out
my structural model of sons’ decisions and discuss estimation and identification of
that model in Section 2.5. In Section 2.6, I present my main results. Section 2.7
concludes and discusses future and ongoing work.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Reasons for Migration
Internal migration is a notable feature of the United States labor market. As
such, it has received extensive attention in the economic literature 2. Existing theory
places the migration decision in a utility-maximizing framework. Individuals choose
the locations that offers the best combination of labor market opportunities and
amenities, with family and social ties being a key non-market amenity in the origin
location. There are many examples in the literature examining each side of this
issue. In a series of papers in the early 1990s, Borjas and co-authors examine internal
migration as an investment by which workers, especially young workers, move to areas
with greater returns for their skills,3 and this general framework studying a single
move characterized a number of subsequent papers. More recently, Kennan and
Walker (2011) apply new modeling techniques to dynamically model a full sequence
of location decisions of high school graduates. In the model, young workers are
driven by income maximization, moving both to gain access to locations with higher
mean wages than their origin or to improve their job match quality if they have a
bad realization in their current location. The model also includes large moving costs
which are subject to idiosyncratic shocks, meaning agents also wait to move when
they face favorable shocks. This framework, in which individuals decide whether or
2 Much of the seminal migration literature is summarized in Greenwood (1997)
3 In particular, see Borjas, Bronars and Trejo (1992a, 1992b)
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not to move every period and account for the possibility of future moves, is what I will
use to build my own model. With a slightly different focus, Basker (2002) models
differing incentives to local or global job search by education as a key reason for
differences in migration rates. Responsiveness to migration incentives by education
is also a primary focus of Wozniak (2010). These papers provide some of the impetus
for me to estimate my model for high school and college graduates, in order to test
possible reasons for the difference in migration rates by education in the context of
my model.
The literature on the family side of the issue largely stems from Mincer (1978),
who directly analyzes the effects of family ties on migration, employment and earn-
ings outcomes. These studies most often focus on intra-household decision-making,
in which migration can have differing payoffs to spouses. In cases where one spouse
would be made better off by moving but the other would be better off staying, the
need for optimization at the household level results in joint location constraints 4
or even marital instability 5. Cooke (2008), writing in a cross-disciplinary review
of migration research, makes the point that family relationships besides marriages
can induce similar tensions between family and income maximization, writing that
“given the growing awareness of how the migrations of adult children and their par-
ents are affected by events in each other’s lives...a broader view of family migration
encompasses not only the migration of a family, but individual migration events that
are made within the context of a family.”
This relationship between parents and adult children has considerably different
features than the more commonly studied relationship between spouses within a
4 Costa and Kahn (2000) and Compton and Pollak (2007) look at this issue for college-educated
couples but reach different conclusions as to whether the location is based primarily on optimal
joint employment concerns or for mainly the husband’s
5 Gemici (2008) models married individuals receiving job offers across geographic regions and finds
effects on divorce rates and the gender wage gap
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household. Spouses make decisions and move together, and as the above papers
show, migration events made for one spouse’s career are very likely to be disruptive
to the other’s. Parents are not joint decision makers with their adult children in
the same way, but as Cooke suggests, they may still affect their children’s migration
decisions. Indeed, this is the focus of papers such as Konrad et al. (2002), in which
elder siblings move away from home to tip responsibility for parent care toward
their younger siblings, and Loken et al. (2011), which finds that married couples in
Norway tend to live closer to the husband’s parents than the wife’s. These papers
focus on the location choices of young adults with respect to their parents for non-
labor market reasons. However, one very important point that is not a key point of
emphasis in these papers is that unlike spousal effects, in which the “trailing spouse”
may have to sacrifice job attributes for the sake of the “leading spouse’s” career,
adult children may in fact benefit from staying near their parents and having access
to their resources, information, or networks. In my analysis, I want to determine
how much of the observed tendency for parents and adult children to live near each
other is due to labor market benefits versus other utility factors.
2.2.2 Parents and Adult Children
In order to look more carefully at the relationship between parents and adult
children, I will also draw on the economic literature on intergenerational correlations
between parents and children. In a Handbook of Labor Economics chapter, Black
and Devereux (2011) give a useful overview on recent literature on intergenerational
linkages. A common starting point is measuring the intergenerational elasticity of
permanent earnings, but many papers extend their analysis either by measuring
transmission of other characteristics such as education, occupation, or IQ, by at-
tempting to identify causal effects of parental characteristics on child outcomes, or
both. To study labor market outcomes, I will follow many researchers by placing
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particular focus on the links between fathers and sons, although I will also use some
maternal characteristics in my analysis.
The most important intergenerational characteristic for my purposes is occupa-
tion. This can be measured either by calculating the incidence of fathers and sons
sharing the same occupation (at a specified level of precision) or alternatively by mea-
suring correlations along a continuous measure of occupation. Using either method,
occupation is consistently found to be highly correlated across generations. I will
consider both alternatives, measuring occupation at the one and three-digit level.
Separately, in much of my analysis, including the structural model, I use a con-
tinuous mapping of three-digit occupations into a “cognitive” and “motor” task
intensity space developed in Yamaguchi (2012). In this paper, Yamaguchi uses the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles to determine the level of cognitive and motor skills
demanded by each three-digit occupation and then ranks each occupation by task in-
tensity in each dimension. He then standardizes them into percentiles (using number
of workers) and normalizes these percentiles of intensities onto a [0,1] scale, trans-
lating three-digit occupations to cognitive-motor pairs on [0,1]x[0,1]. In this paper,
he is interested in tracing how workers choose among occupations and develop their
own skill-specific human capital in order to maximize their long-run welfare in the
labor market. I will use the measure somewhat differently. For my purposes, it is
valuable to have a continuous index of occupations to measure transmission of oc-
cupation on more than a binary scale of whether sons enter fathers’ occupations,
and I prefer this mapping of occupations into a two-dimensional space to using a
one-dimensional occupational prestige index because I want to see whether a sons
benefit from having a father with a “good” occupation, but also whether they ben-
efit when in a similar occupation whatever its characteristics. An example of the
former case is a father in an executive or managerial position who is able to use his
connections to get his son an entry-level position of any type, whereas the latter case
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would be consistent with a situation in which a son looking for an office job benefits
from a father in a white-collar occupation himself, but a son looking for a blue-collar
job may benefit more from a father who works in a factory or on a construction
crew. I am not interested in modeling directed occupation search or skill formation,
but rather focus on intergenerational relationships in occupation and how agents’
occupation characteristics interact with a permanent ability to produce returns in
the labor market. At all points, it is important to keep in mind the task intensities
represent characteristics of an individual’s - whether father or son - occupation, and
not of the individual himself. With this in mind, I will introduce the following no-
tation. Using the Yamaguchi measure, each occupation j has cognitive and motor
task intensities rcogpjitq,motpjitqs. If individual i works in occupation j at time t,
I will use the notation cogpjitq for the task intensity of his occupation, where task
intensity is a function only of an occupation, and jit denotes that i has occupation j
at time t.
One crucial yet difficult question in the literature is that even if there is a corre-
lation between father’s occupation and son’s outcomes, which I will show that there
is using my adaptation of the Yamaguchi measures, it may still be difficult to deter-
mine the mechanisms of this correlation. Sons may end up in similar occupations
to their fathers because those fathers help them find similar jobs, because they have
naturally similar skill sets, or because the sons are exposed to father’s occupation
and learn more about it. There are numerous efforts to shed light on some aspect
of these mechanisms. One strategy is to investigate the incidence of fathers and
sons working for the same employer, which can be evidence of fathers using their
connections on their children’s behalf. Corak and Piraino (2010) find the incidence
of employment at the same firm is common in Canada, especially for high earners.
Kramarz and Skans (2007) find that Swedish sons are more likely than their class-
mates with similar skills to get a job at their father’s plant, although in contrast
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this finding applies mostly to low-educated workers. Hellerstein and Morrill (2011)
use comparisons in probabilities that children (particularly daughters) enter their
fathers’ versus fathers-in-law’s occupations to shed light on parental investments in
children, modeling the difference between the two as a measure of transmission of
occupation-specific human capital.
2.2.3 Parents’ Effects on Wages
I am interested in whether fathers affect sons’ wages through two primary chan-
nels: first, whether they act as a “family tie” and depress wages by limiting mobility,
such as seen in the mostly spouse-based migration literature growing out of Mincer,
and second, whether they affect occupation or earnings through direct labor market
intervention, as is considered in the intergenerational correlation in earnings litera-
ture. I will also have to account for observed and unobserved similarities between
parents and children. One strategy used in several studies of intergenerational elas-
ticity of earnings is to try to decompose the effect on earnings by a two-step process,
determining the effects of parents on intermediate outcomes and then the effects
those outcomes have on wages, for instance Gintis and Bowles (2002). However,
to my knowledge few if any of these studies track the relative locations of parents
and adult children and interact that with characteristics. This is a primary focus
of what I will do. I will think of proximity to parents both as a possible compen-
sating differential, in which case it will have a negative effect on wages, and also as
a potential source of opportunity in the labor market, in which case it may have a
positive effect. First, I will present correlations and regressions uncorrected for any
type of selectivity to establish the patterns in the data, and then I will develop a
model that will incorporate unobserved ability that may differ between migrants and
non-migrants and different education or occupation groups.
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics and Regressions
2.3.1 Data Description
I build my dataset using white male PSID respondents aged 18-35. I posit that
younger men are more likely to require help from parents or other social networks
both in the labor market and for resource sharing or other informal or social help
outside the labor market. Additionally, parents of individuals in this age group are
typically working age themselves or very recently retired, meaning resource flows
ought to primarily go from parents to children. In later years, when parents are
retired and may face health issues while their adult children are more established,
the direction of care may be a much different issue. I choose to focus on men because
career-based location decisions of young couples are typically made for the sake of
the husband’s career 6, which means that young men’s decisions are the most likely
to be made for own income or family reasons, as opposed to the spouse’s income. I
limit the sample to whites, the largest ethnic group in the PSID and US population,
in order to abstract from potential cultural differences across groups.7 Further, I cut
the sample to “second-generation” PSID respondents. By this, I mean I use only the
children of original 1968 PSID heads and wives. The advantage of this subsample
is that they are the only group for whom both mother and father are endowed
with the “PSID gene.” Only individuals with the PSID gene are guaranteed to be
followed across all PSID waves regardless of other household composition. By using
second-generation individuals, I should thus observe location and other information
for both parents regardless of which PSID following rules are in effect for a given
year, the individual’s age or his parents’ marital status. Even in areas in which I
6 Compton and Pollack show this is true even for “power couples” in which both couples have
high education
7 Kennan and Walker make a similar data cut, as does Bishop. Both of these studies further limit
their sample to high school-educated men.
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only require father’s information, this is valuable because I know that all fathers of
second-generation respondents will have the PSID gene.
I then clean the data and generate variables to create the analysis sample. I take
each of my sample member’s age, income and hours worked, three-digit occupation,
educational achievement, US state of residence, and household headship status di-
rectly from survey data. I also use linking information to find whether the agent’s
mother and father are respondents in that year of the data, and if so what their
employment, occupation, and state of residence are. I also know whether the parent
and child live in the same household. I use the sample years 1976-1993 because that
is a relatively consistent period of sample data collection, as well as because many
second-generation PSID respondents came of age during this time period.
One key limitation of the PSID, for my purposes, is that while income and hours
worked are available for all respondents, occupation is usually only reported for
the male and female heads of household. This means that occupation decisions of
individuals who live with their parents, but are working, cannot be measured as it
can for individuals living independently.
For all types of occupations, I measure wage hourly by taking reported annual
income and dividing by hours worked. After 1990, labor and asset income are mea-
sured separately, and I use labor income to determine wage. Before 1990, all income
is reported together (although whether an individual had any asset income is asked).
In the earlier waves, I use an imputation to estimate labor income for those who
report having both types of income8. In order to limit the effect of outliers, I enforce
that all wage rates must be between $1 and $100 per hour in 2007 dollars.
I also fix individuals’ education and home location over time. For every observa-
8 I use the newer waves to estimate what proportion of income is asset income, controlling for
education and other individual characteristics, and assume this function holds for the older waves.
Since this is a young sample, most individuals do not report any asset income, leading me to believe
this does not meaningfully affect my analysis
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tion, I make the individual’s home location the location (measured alternatively at
the US state or MSA level) at age 17. If the location is unavailable for any reason, I
go back one year at a time until I have a non-missing entry. For education, I record
the highest educational level ever achieved. For analysis purposes, I use this to divide
the population into four education groups: those with less than a high school degree,
those with a high school degree but no college, those with some but less than four
years of college education, and those with a bachelor’s or graduate degree. In the
primary analysis, I will use the education groups with the most observations: high
school graduates with no college education, and college degree holders.
I also make use of the restricted-access PSID Geocode data, in which individuals’
location is more precisely measured than what is available in the public data. In the
analysis, I use Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) as an alternative to state. For
the purposes of the descriptive regressions, using MSA serves as a robustness check
to state in determining whether parents and children are in the “same location.” If
necessary, I can be even more precise; the Geocode data allows for a determination
by county or zip code, which can be used to approximate actual distance between
households or across moves. I choose MSA as my primary unit of measurement
because it is a good approximation of a city and labor market. I expect parents
to affect children most when they share a labor market, and an MSA also closely
approximates a same-day driveable distance which would be important if preferences
for living near parents has to do with proximity, as would be necessary for child care
or for sharing meals, storage space or other household resources.9 Respondents in
rural areas are grouped into non-MSA regions for labor market purposes.
9 One possible extension for future work is to use the Geocode data to measure within-city distance,
which could have an especially strong effect on resource sharing, but in this paper I will only use
MSA-level data.
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2.3.2 Geographic Mobility
The most important fact about place of residence is also the most basic: most
young people live near where they grew up. This is true for all education groups,
although the effect is weaker as education increases. When I define a home MSA, as
in Table 2.110, I see fewer individuals remaining at home than state-level analyses
but the relative patterns by age and education are similar. The 18-23 year old group
is the least different, but among 24-29 and 30-35 year olds the likelihood of being at
home is 10-15 percentage points lower. College graduates over 30 are more likely to
be outside their home MSA than in it (39.6%), the only group for whom that holds.
As a corollary to the statistics on home location, there is a difference in annual
inter-MSA move rates across education. As seen in Table 2.2, these rates are most
dissimilar among the 24-29 and 30-35 age groups, after college graduates have com-
pleted school. For 24-29 year olds, annual inter-MSA move rates reach nearly 15%
for college graduates and 8-10% for the other groups, with a corresponding 9.3% and
4-6% for 30-35 year olds.
Both the home location and move statistics calculated in the tables are deter-
mined from each person-year observation in the data. In order to get a balanced
cross-section, I look at total moves made by age 30, as well as the proportion of
individuals that have made at least one move by that age. Over half of college grad-
uates have moved across MSAs by 30, as have about one-third of others. Movers are
divided roughly by thirds as to whether they have made one, two, or more than two
moves. Total moves per mover tends to rise with education, although high school
graduates are more likely to have made three or more moves than those with some
college (but no four-year degree). These results are presented in Table 2.3.
10 In the appendix, I report the following tables by state instead of MSA to facilitate comparison to
Greenwood and Malloy. My sample shows similar migration rates to those found by these authors
using CPS or Census data.
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The data on move rates is consistent with what Malloy et al. and others have
found using larger national datasets. While long-distance moves are relatively low
probability events annually, they are still important since many young workers make
them at some point and due to the infrequency of moving, each move is likely to
have lasting effects. It is also noteworthy that moves are more common when using
MSA-level data such as I have from the Geocode information than when using state
data.
2.3.3 Intergenerational Correlations
In the background section of the paper, I discussed some of the economic liter-
ature about internal migration and about intergenerational correlations of various
characteristics. In this section, I note the basic structure of intergenerational corre-
lations in my data and confirm that it is similar to what has been found previously,
as I have done in the last section for the mobility statistics.
First, I look at the simplest form of intergenerational transmission to measure:
education. Not surprisingly, fathers and sons tend to get similar levels of education.
As shown in Table 2.4, 22% of sons of high school dropouts become dropouts them-
selves, whereas sons of high school graduates drop out at 6% and sons of college
graduates just under 1%. Nearly 60% of sons of college graduates obtain four-year
degrees themselves, more than twice the rate of sons of high school graduates or
those with some college. Children of fathers with some college are more likely to get
some college than those of high school graduates, although the proportion getting
four-year degrees is similar between those groups. This is a result noted by Black et
al (2005) and Ermisch and Francesconi (2001), among others. If I treat my education
groups as a continuous instead of a categorical variable, taking values of 0 through
3 for increasing levels of education in the four groups I define, I obtain a correla-
tion coefficient of 0.43, similar to what is found in the intergenerational correlations
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literature.
When looking at similarity by one-digit occupation, many sons are in different
professions from their fathers. “Professional work” is the most commonly transferred,
with about half of sons of professional workers becoming professional workers them-
selves, but that category is fairly broad and mostly driven by the transmission of
college education. Overall, around 25% of sons are in the same one-digit occupation
as their fathers, a result close to that found by Hellerstein and Morrill.
By their continuous nature, the Yamaguchi measures allow for a closer look at
occupational similarity beyond only measuring whether sons go into the same careers
as their fathers. As displayed in Table 2.5, the correlation of cognitive task intensity
of father’s and sons’ occupation in the same period is 0.58. The correlation of father’s
and sons’ motor task intensity is 0.48. These results are both fairly stable by sons’ or
fathers’ education levels. Focusing on the son’s occupation task intensities, cognitive
and motor intensities are negatively correlated (-0.19).
Finally, I run regressions with the son’s occupational cognitive task intensity as
the dependent variable, with measures of father’s occupation and location among
the explanatory variables. These regressions are designed to test how well father’s
occupation correlates with son’s once other controls are included, and, more directly
pertinent to my analysis, whether these correlations are affected by the father and
son’s relative locations. I focus primarily on an occupation’s cognitive rather than
motor intensity because, as I will show later, occupational cognitive intensity con-
sistently correlates with higher wages where motor intensity does not. I use the
following OLS specification:
cogpjitq  γ1ItrL
f
it  `s   γ2motpjitq   ItrL
f
it  `s  pγ3cogpj
f
itq   γ4motpj
f
itqq
 ItrL
f
it  `s  pγ5cogpj
f
itq   γ6motpj
f
itqq   λZit   µit (2.1)
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In this regression and the wage regressions to follow, i indicates the individual,
l individual’s location, t calendar year, X years of experience, and ItrL
f
it  `s is an
indicator function for whether the individual resides in the father’s location. The
cognitive and motor task intensity of the individual’s occupation j at time t is denoted
cogpjitq and motpjitq, and task intensities of the father’s time t occupation are cogpj
f
itq
and motpjfitq. In this particular formula, Zit stands for a set of controls including
age, marital and fertility status and father’s education. In these regressions, I will
stratify by education of the individual.
The results from this equation, shown in Table 2.6, establish that father’s occupa-
tion and location does play a role in task intensities. Individuals in the same location
as their fathers tend to be working in occupations with lower task intensities, but
the result is small or zero in most cases. The father’s occupation’s cognitive intensity
is strongly positively correlated with the son’s occupation’s cognitive intensity for
all education groups, and this effect is larger when father and son are in the same
state or MSA. Motor intensity of occupations is less important but typically has the
opposite relative effect.
Even establishing a correlation between father and son’s occupations’ task inten-
sity still leaves open the question of why this relationship exists. I will attempt to
address this question in the model, but the descriptive regressions do not distinguish
between any number of possible reasons. It may be this correlation reflects common
ability or interests between fathers and sons that leads them to enter similar occu-
pations. If so, this commonality could itself have multiple possible causes. It could
come either through genetics or else be a product of the environment, in which a
young son observes his father’s occupation, learns about it and that familiarity leads
him to enter a similar occupation himself upon reaching adulthood. It could also
be the father has contacts within his own occupation or similar occupations to help
find his son employment in certain occupations. The reason behind the result that
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cognitive task intensity is more strongly correlated between father and son’s occu-
pation when they share a location also cannot be pinned down by these regressions.
Sons who choose to remain near fathers may be more similar than those who do
not, or they may face more similar job opportunities, or they may be more likely
to have fathers intercede for them directly in the labor market. The regression in
Table 2.6 only suffices to establish intergenerational correlation in occupation task
intensities; in the model section, I will discuss ways in which I make efforts to distin-
guish these possible explanations and also denote where the model will not be able
to make these distinctions. Making these distinctions is important because different
potential mechanisms underlying intergenerational correlations in occupation have
different implications for how parents affect their sons’ labor market opportunities
and therefore how sons make location decisions.
2.3.4 Mobility and Wages
Since moving is a costly process, it may not be surprising that moves are rare.
The necessary economic question of interest is what benefits are agents attempting to
gain by moving, and the most standard answer is that there may be wage benefits to
searching a national labor market. To see whether this is supported in the raw data,
I first simply determine mean wages by education and location. These results are
in Table 2.7. For college graduates, individuals living in the same location as their
fathers have lower wages than those who live in a different location as their fathers.
However, high school graduates are more likely to live near their fathers and, more
strikingly, do not have lower wages for the subgroup near their fathers. I examine
these correlations further by using wage regressions to see how these correlations are
affected by other characteristics.
This set of wage regressions are described in Table 2.8 of the paper. The overall
purpose of these regressions is not to attempt to establish a causal relationship but
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instead to motivate the structural model. When accounting for more covariates in
a simple way, the correlations in Table 2.7 appear to hold up and other interesting
correlations emerge: I find that occupational attributes of the father correlate more
strongly with wages of sons when the two live in the same labor market. During the
rest of this section, I will use the descriptive regressions to highlight these correla-
tions, and then in the next section I will write down a model to attempt to determine
the reasons for the patterns seen here.
In that spirit, I begin by running the following wage regression separately by
education group:
ln wijlt  β0l   β0j   β0t   β1Xit   β2X
2
it   β3ItrL
f
it  `s   νijlt (2.2)
These regressions are subscripted as in the previous section, with Xit indicating
years of experience at time t, β0l, β0j and β0t indicating vectors of dummy variables
for location, one-digit occupation and calendar year, and ItrL
f
it  `s an indicator for
whether the individual’s father is located in the same location ` as the individual.
Like the statistics on mobility themselves, these results differ by education. As
shown in Model 1 of Table 2.8, college graduates’ log wages are .12 lower for the
group in their home MSA, but high school graduates’ are essentially unchanged.
While this is only a starting point, it suggests that wage effect of a national labor
market may differ for college graduates, and in fact high school graduates may not
suffer a wage penalty from staying near parents.
2.3.5 Continuous Occupation Measure
As a continuous alternative to one-digit occupation, I use Yamaguchi’s continuous
measure of occupation. This is an index between 0 and 1 built from skill sets required
by three-digit occupation as recorded in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. One
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key benefit to using a continuous measure is that it allows for measuring correlations
and similarities in occupations across generations, but to begin with I will replace
the occupation dummies with cognitive and motor task intensities in the base wage
equation:
ln wilt  β0l   β0t   β1Xit   β2X
2
it   β3ItrL
f
it  `s
 β4cogpjitq   β5motpjitq   νijlt (2.3)
Here, I define cogpjitq and motpjitq as the individual’s occupation task intensities,
using these as covariates in place of Wj. These results, as shown in Model 2 of Table
2.8, have very similar point estimates for father’s location as Model 1, with a slightly
larger negative effect for college graduates. The cognitive skill intensity itself has
positive effects on wages for both high school and college graduates.
2.3.6 Father’s Occupation and Wages
The next step I take is to include father’s occupation in the wage equation.
There are at least two simple explanations for why fathers in occupations with higher
cognitive intensities might correlate to sons with higher wages in these regressions,
even after accounting for sons’ own occupations. The first is that including father’s
occupation may provide an additional signal of the son’s unobserved qualities. A
second explanation is that the father may want to help the son in the labor market
directly, and fathers in certain occupations are in a better position to do so. If this
results in more good job matches or favorable treatment, then sons’s wages may be
sensitive to father’s occupation.
While I emphasize that the regressions in this stage of the paper are descriptive,
they can show whether father’s occupation has any explanatory power at all on the
son’s wages. If not, than neither of the above stories are likely to explain wages. With
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this in mind, I run a regression that includes father’s occupation’s task intensities,
which I denote using f superscripts.
ln wilt  β0l   β0t   β1Xit   β2X
2
it   β3ItrL
f
it  `s   β4cogpjitq   β5motpjitq
 β6cogpj
f
itq   β7motpj
f
itq   νijlt (2.4)
Under this formulation, Model 3 in Table 2.8, I find that the cognitive intensity
of father’s occupation has a positive correlation with wages for both high school
and college graduates. The son’s own cognitive intensity continues to be associated
with higher wages and being in the father’s location continues to have a negative
correlation with college graduates’ wages, both effects that were seen in the previous
specifications.
Next, I take one other step and look at family proximity. The father may have
more influence in his own labor market than he will if his son lives far away, but any
completed transmission of human capital through investment or unobserved ability
should benefit the son in any market. This is a way that may help distinguish the
two theories above. Continuing to define father’s location as Lfit, I run the equation
with the following interaction terms:
ln wilt  β0l   β0t   β1Xit   β2X
2
it   β3ItrL
f
it  `s   β4cogpjitq   β5motpjitq
 ItrL
f
it  `s  pβ6cogpj
f
itq   β7motpj
f
itqq
 ItrL
f
it  `s  pβ8cogpj
f
itq   β9motpj
f
itqq   νijlt (2.5)
Across education groups, the pattern on point estimates is that the father’s occu-
pation’s cognitive intensity was relatively more strongly associated with son’s wages
when father and son lived in the same location, and father’s occupation’s motor in-
tensity was more strongly associated with higher son’s wages when they did not live
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in the same location. This is seen in Model 4 of Table 2.8. Father’s occupation’s
cognitive intensity was positive and significant when in the same location for high
school graduates and college graduates.
The final specification I will consider (Model 5 of Table 2.8) is to test whether
occupational similarity between fathers and sons affect wages. The previous re-
gression includes father’s characteristics, but it presumes that there is an absolute
advantage or disadvantage associated with a father’s occupation. Here, I will add
a measure of occupational distance to the specification, where distance is measured
occdistpjit, j
f
itq 
b
pcogpjitq  cogpj
f
itqq
2   pmotpjitq motpj
f
itqq
2. The full specifica-
tion is:
ln wilt  β0l   β0t   β1Xit   β2X
2
it   β3ItrL
f
it  `s   β4cogpjitq   β5motpjitq
 ItrL
f
it  `s  pβ6cogpj
f
itq   β7motpj
f
itq   β10occdistpjit, j
f
itqq
 ItrL
f
it  `s  pβ8cogpj
f
itq   β9motpj
f
itq   β11occdistpjit, j
f
itqq   νijlt(2.6)
In this formulation, the effects for high school and college graduates of occupa-
tional task intensity, both of the son and father, are similar to the results from Model
4. College graduates in the same location as fathers tended to have higher wages
when occupational distance was high, meaning the occupations were dissimilar in
cognitive/motor space, and high school graduates had higher wages when occupa-
tional distance was high and they were in different locations from their fathers.
In this section of the paper, I have done three things. First, I have established
the PSID subsample I will use empirically and provided summaries of young adults’
geographic mobility and intergenerational correlations with their parents, finding
similar levels of mobility and correlation in the PSID to what others have found us-
ing other data. In establishing intergenerational correlation of occupation, I have also
introduced Yamaguchi’s continuous measure of two-dimensional occupation task in-
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tensity, which I will continue to use in the structural model as my primary method of
characterizing occupations. Finally, I have shown descriptive evidence that parents’
characteristics and location correlate with son’s wages. In particular, the regressions
establish two major patterns. College graduates tend to have lower wages when in
the same MSA as their fathers, but this is not true for high school graduates. Also,
for both high school and college graduates, an individual’s wages tend to be higher
when his father is both in an occupation with a high cognitive task intensity and is
in the same MSA as he is.
Since these regressions do not have any way of distinguishing between possible
reasons for these patterns, my preferred interpretations of these correlations is not as
strong evidence per se for the impact of fathers on son’s wages, but as evidence that
the question is worthy of further exploration. The goal of the next section of the
paper will be to build a model under whose assumptions the effects of preferences
for family, unobserved similarities between fathers and sons, and direct labor market
effects fathers can have on sons are distinguished.
2.4 Model
While informative about the correlations in the data, the descriptive regressions
are not able to value wage outcomes against non-monetary preferences or distinguish
between channels of parental influence. The results in the previous section may
represent the combination of a number of ways fathers’ attributes correlate with
sons’ accepted wages. First, information about the task intensities of the father’s
occupation may be a signal of the son’s ability that would otherwise be uncontrolled
for. Second, fathers in certain types of occupations may have the local influence
to intercede for their sons in the labor market, and those sons gain higher wages
either through nepotism or because they are better matched to occupations where
they can be most productive. Third, sons may consider proximity to parents to be
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an amenity of their parents’ location and therefore be willing to accept lower wages
in their father’s location than they would be willing to take elsewhere. All of these
factors may be acting on son’s wages, and the descriptive regressions will not be able
to determine anything beyond the sum of these effects.
In order to address these issues, I set forth a model of location choice, parental co-
residence and occupation switching decisions of young adults. Agents choose where
to reside, whether to seek a new occupation and whether to enter the labor market
at all in each period. At the beginning of every period, an agent may either be
employed or not and may be living in a parent-headed household or a self-headed
household. 11
The model is designed to incorporate choices that cannot be fully accounted for in
the wage regressions of the previous section. The choice model allows for preferences,
human capital transmission, and networking effects of parents to be distinguished
from separate sources of variation in the data. I can also build in partially unobserved
ability and job match measures and allow agents to be forward-looking. The total
effect of building in these model features is to allow me to say, under the assumptions
of the model, what causes the patterns of correlation between parents’ attributes
and sons’ wages that are shown in the previous section. In the subsections below,
I will discuss what elements of the model are designed to account for each of the
channels by which parents affect sons’ decisions and wages. The model serves two
major purposes. First, by embedding the wage equation into a fuller choice model,
I can account for the selectivity of movers, across both locations and occupations.
Secondly, I am also interested in the preference values themselves and how they affect
propensity to migrate across locations and switch occupations.
11 I abstract from other living situations (with grandparents or other friends or relatives) since
these are rare cases. For the exposition of the model, I will also discuss moving out of the parents’
household as a one-way decision, although in reality there are a small but non-trivial number of
young adults that move out and later move back. With addtional parameters or assumptions, the
model can be extended to this case.
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The choice model provides three main channels for parents to affect adult chil-
dren’s wages. The first channel is through preferences, in which children like to live
near their parents and may stay nearby rather than seek out labor markets with
higher wages. This is analogous to the “tied stayer” incentive that is the focus of
most of the intra-household family migration literature originating from Mincer. The
second channel is through human capital. Agents will enter the labor market with
fixed cognitive and motor abilities which represents all inputs in childhood, whether
by genetics, parental investment, primary school education or other reasons. I will
make no effort to distinguish the impact of these childhood inputs relative to each
other, but rather am only interested in accounting for their total effect on labor mar-
ket outcomes. These abilities are intrinsic to an individual and do not change over
time, unlike the occupational task intensities that I have discussed in the previous
section and will use again in the model. The returns to these abilities in the labor
market, as I will show when forming the wage equation, will depend on interactions
with the task intensities of the current occupation. Parents’ education and aver-
age occupation and employment information enter into the child’s ability measures,
and the manner in which they enter is not dependent on where the parents live (or
whether they are still living). The third channel is through labor market interven-
tion. I allow father’s occupation and the occupational distance12 between father and
son’s current occupations in cognitive-motor space to enter directly into the son’s
wage equation only if they are in the same location. I attribute any effect of this,
remaining after adjusting for the son’s preferences and abilities, to the father’s ability
12 I consider only father’s characteristics for this direct effect for two reasons. First, the literature
supports the notion that transmission of occupation from father to son is much stronger than mother
to son. Second, in descriptive regressions in which I used both mother and father’s occupation
measures, the effect of mother’s characteristics on sons’ wages and occupation were weaker than
the effect of father’s characteristics overall and also showed less sensitivity to interactions with
whether parent and son lived in the same location. Thus, I exclude mother’s characteristics from
the direct wage and occupation transition effects, while leaving them in the ability measures.
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to directly improve his son’s labor market outcomes 13
2.4.1 Model Timing
In this section, I discuss timing of the agent’s decisions and realizations. Before
completing his education, the agent has not made any relevant decisions to the
model. I assume he is living in his parents’ household and has no work experience or
occupation. In the first period of adulthood, I assume that the agent enters the labor
market for the first time, by a process I do not model explictly as I will for future
periods. At the end of this initial period, I assume that he observes not only his wage
ln w, but he also has an accounting to determine what is attributable in his realized
wages to his forecast errors, which are defined in the wage subsection below as ζi,cog
and ζi,mot, his match quality, θij, and his transient error, νit. Therefore, after this
first period agents know the true values of their abilities, although the econometrician
does not observe the error decomposition must still determine probabilities the agent
is in given types of ζs and θ. This means that from the agent’s perspective, there is
no learning in the model after period one. All periods after the first will be the same,
with the only information updating being new realizations of any time-varying state
variables.
Following the first period, I assume the model timing is as follows. At the begin-
ning of the period, the agent knows his parents’ location, father’s occupation, and
current marital and fertility status. He receives preference shocks and observes his
utility in various choices up to his expected counterfactual wages. I also assume that
if he gets married or has his first child, these happen at the end of the period so
13 This relies on the identifying assumption that any intervention of the father’s through better
information or networking or any other cause can only be done when father and son are in the same
labor market. This seems a good first step, especially for scenarios as in the literature where the
father may help the son find a job at his own plant or with his own employer. The current model
will not account for the possibility that some fathers may have connections in other labor markets
and could therefore help their sons at a distance, except to the extent this could be considered to
be part of the son’s “permanent ability” measure.
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he will go into the next period with an updated family status. Furthermore, any
parent mortality is assumed to occur at the end of the period and that living par-
ents announce their any changes in location, occupations and employment status in
between periods, so that the agent can account for these when making next period
choices.
2.4.2 Choice Set
In each period after the first, agents make a choice about their location and
occupation. The size of the choice set depends on the conditions from the previous
period. While the location and occupation decisions are actually modeled as one joint
choice, I will first lay out the possibilities in each dimension separately to explain
the intuition.
The first period of adulthood is either age 18, for those who do not have any post-
secondary education, or else the first year after full-time education is completed for
those who attended college, and this is the period in which agents learn their abilities.
The education decision itself is taken as given. In the final period before the agent
enters adulthood (time zero), he is assumed to live in his parents’ household, which
itself is located in a US state or MSA, depending on the unit used. This is called
the agent’s “home location,” which will never change regardless of own or parents’
moves later.
In every period after the first, the agent chooses to live in one of five locations.
First, he can always choose to remain in his current location, which I call the “stay
option. Second, he can always move to his home location. Third and fourth, he can
always choose to move to his father’s or mother’s current location. Finally, he can
make what I will refer to as a “national move,” which covers all other locations in the
US. In this case, the agent does not choose between locations, but rather chooses to
move and is randomly assigned to another location according to a transition process.
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This can be thought of as an abstraction of making a national labor market search
and taking the best option among those. Since some of these defintions will overlap
in practice, agents have somewhere between two and five location choices depending
on their current living situation. The Stay and National choices are always available.
The Home, Mother and Father options will be distinct from these two and from
each other only if the agent or parent has moved in previous periods. Thus, all five
options will be present only in the unusual case in which parents are separated and
the agent and both parents all live in different locations from one another and the
original home.
A special case occurs for agents who begin a period not only in their parents’
location, but still in their parents’ household. In this case, an agent’s Stay choice is
to remain in the parent’s household, and the parent choice is to establish their own
household in that location. I view moving out as a one way choice; in the model,
agents who have established their own households may never move back in with their
parents.14
Occupation decisions work in a roughly analogous manner to location. In the
model, an agent never chooses an occupation per se. Rather, they have an option to
seek a new occupation, matching with an occupation according to some transition
probability that is a function of their observed and unobserved individual charac-
teristics. Conceptually, they may choose to enter an “occupation lottery” for a new
occupation draw, but with their draw weighted by abilities and current occupation.
Similarly to the National location move, this is an abstraction of a process in which
the agent finds a new best available occupation.
Employed agents have three choices. They may stay in their current occupation,
14 This assumption is for simplicity and to separate those who never move out (and never become
PSID heads of household) from those who move back after having lived independently. My frame-
work could be written to allow individuals to return to parents’ households, and this is a question
I plan to revisit in the future.
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choose to not work, or choose to change occupations but remain in the labor market.
In the latter case, they will enter a new occupation with certainty; in terms of
the model, this means that those who pay the occupation switching cost will in
fact switch occupations rather than test the market and return to their current
occupation. This is the only way to change occupations. In the model, there is no
exogenous job destruction and anyone who wishes to work will become employed.
Since I model location and occupation decisions jointly, I consider a staying decision
to be remaining in the same location and occupation. An occupation spell, in this
context, is a location-occupation pair. If an agent makes a geographic move, they will
automatically have to reset their occupation tenure and pay the occupation switching
cost, no matter what occupation they enter into in the new location.
My occupation switching process differs in a few ways from a standard job search
model. For one, I am interested in occupations, not jobs, meaning that I am not
working with firm-specific matches or firm-specific human capital. Second, there is
no learning for the agent about his own abilities or matches after the first period. He
observes his own ability at the end of his first period of adulthood, and if he chooses an
occupation switch in future periods he will immediately enter a new occupation and
observes his location-occupation match quality at the end of that period. However,
while he knows the distributions he will draw from, he is not permitted to observe
these realizations before making the decision to switch. This model also means that
my occupation switching cost may have a somewhat different interpretation from a
standard job search cost. Since my occupation switching is undirected, there may be
a cost associated with the reality of higher skill occupations being less substitutable
for one another. If this depresses the number of high-skill occupation changes, this
may be partially attributed to switching cost.
Therefore, household heads have three labor market choices in their current lo-
cation (keep their current occupation, switch occupations, and not work) plus two
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choices times the number of possible moves (work and not work for each location
choice), for somewhere between five and eleven choices. Agents in parent-headed
households face a similar choice set, but we do not observe occupation for non-heads.
Therefore, the Stay option for non-heads is only crossed with the decision of whether
or not to work. They also may always choose to establish their own household in the
current location, and by definition begin the period in the same location as at least
one parent. This results in six to ten choices. In all cases, the agent takes parents’
location and occupations as given at the point of decision-making.
The agent is motivated by utility derived from wages, preferences for home and
parents as well as preferences for employment and household headship, location and
occupation switching costs, and random preference shocks. Preferences and moving
costs may change based on whether the agent is married or has children. Wages are
partially dependent on occupation task intensity, experience, occupation tenure, par-
ents’ proximity and characteristics, own ability, location-occupation match quality.
In the following sections, I will describe in detail how the agent values each of the
above factors.
2.4.3 Utility
In each period, the utility takes the form:
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1sq
  pα6   α7mart1   α8childt1q ItrL
p  `s
 α9ItrH
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  pα10   α11mart1   α12childt1q Itrhome  `s
 α13Itrempit  0s   α14ItrH
p  1sItrempit  0s   εijlt (2.7)
where i indexes individual, j occupation, l location, t time, p parent, and j’ and
l1 previous occupation and location. I use empit indicate whether i was employed
in period t, a value of zero indicating non-employment, and marit and childit to
indicate whether the agent is married or has children, respectively, at time t, with
marit taking a value of 1 for married individuals and childit 1 for individuals with at
least one child. Lp indicators are 1 if at least one parent lives in the same location `
as the individual, but is not co-resident, and Hp indicators are 1 when the agent is
in the same household as at least one parent.15
Wages are a key component of utility I will discuss in the next section, and there
are a number of other factors that affect utility as well. I include moving costs,
occupation switching costs, preferences for living in the fixed home location or near
parents, and a utility from not working in the labor market in the model.
Any time the agent changes locations, a moving cost is paid. The moving cost,
represented by α2, α3 and α4, is a function of marital and fertility status, as well as
a baseline cost for any move. This cost is for moves is across geographic locations
15 I considered alternative specifications in which preferences were allowed to vary by mother and
father’s location separately, but these did not result in substantially different parameter estimates
so I present the simpler form here and in the empirical results.
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only; the cost to establish one’s own household from the parent’s household without
leaving the parents’ location is not identified separately from the utility value of
remaining in the parents’ household.
Similarly, agents must pay a constant switching cost α5 to switch occupations
within a location or to search for an occupation after making a geographic move.
Agents receive utility from residing in the same location16 or household as parents
and in the fixed home location, which can be modified based on marriage and fertility
status. Non-employed agents also receive a utility benefit, interpretable as leisure,
home production or a combination thereof, which is further interacted with living in
a parent’s household. In the model, preferences for parents’ location are represented
by α6, α7 and α8, parents’ household by α9, home location by α10, α11 and α12, and
non-employment by α13 and additionally α14 when in parents’ household.
In the static model, agents choose the option that gives the most flow utility. In
the dynamic case, they maximize discounted utility over time.
2.4.4 Wages
The wage equation is as follows. Before accounting for parental characteristics,
the wage equation takes the form specified by 2.8.
16 In the empirical specification, MSA
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Log wages are a function of the vector of location dummies β0l and year dummies
β0t, general experience X, job tenure T, occupational task intensities cogpjitq and
motpjitq, permanent cognitive and motor skill ηi,cog and ηi,mot, which will be described
more fully in the discussion and formulation of Equations 2.9 and 2.10 below, job
match quality θij, whether the individual is the head of household, and interactions
of experience, tenure, location, and skill with the task intensities of the occupation.
This setup is a modification of standard wage equations in the literature to the two-
dimensional framework of occupation I am using in my model. Ideally, I would have
the same information on everyone, but for non-heads, occupation is not observed. In
those cases I set task intensities and occupation tenure to zero, treating non-headship
as if it were another occupation with its own return to experience as well as cognitive
and motor ability. In the timing of the model, the agent will learn his θij at the end
of the period if he is in a new location-occupation pair, or he keeps his θ draw if
he is in the same pair as the last period. When he is deciding whether to switch
occupations, he will not know what draw of θij he will receive in his new occupation
until after he decides to work there.
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This specification in 2.8 differs in several key ways from the descriptive regressions
from the previous section. While I reuse β notation, these are different from the
previous coefficients. The introduction of the η abilities allows me to treat occupation
task intensities differently. In this equation, what is related to higher returns is
not the task intensities themselves, as in the descriptive regressions, but the match
of an occupation’s tasks to human capital of the individual. An individual in an
occupation with high cognitive task intensity may see little return if his ability ηi,cog,
experience and occupation tenure are low. Correspondingly, returns to high values
of ηs, experience or tenure will be muted in occupations whose task intensities are
low. The match quality θij will also play a role.
Next, I form the forecasting equations for the cognitive and motor abilities ηi,cog
and ηi,mot. Upon entering adulthood, he does not know them with certainty. He
instead forecasts his ability ηi,cog and ηi,mot using both parents’ education and occu-
pation history as signals for his own cognitive and motor ability. In Equations 2.9
and 2.10 below, parents’ characteristics cog, mot, and NW denote the average task
intensities and labor force attachment of the parent over all waves they appear in
the analysis sample.17 Educ variables, superscripted by parent, indicate dummies for
the four levels of education defined in the earlier sections of the paper. The errors in
the son’s time-zero forecast are ζi,cog and ζi,mot, which he will discover at the end of
the first period upon entering the labor market but will always be unobserved from
the perspective of the econometrician.
ηi,cog  φ1,cogEduc
f   φ2,cogEduc
m   φ3,cogcog
f   φ4,cogmot
f
  φ5,cogNW
f
 φ6,cogcog
m   φ7,cogmot
m
  φ8,cogNW
m
  ζi,cog (2.9)
17 Years not in the labor force are ignored when determining parents’ mean task intensities.
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ηi,mot  φ1,motEducf   φ2,motEducm   φ3,motcog
f   φ4,motmot
f
  φ5,motNW
f
 φ6,motcog
m   φ7,motmot
m
  φ8,motNW
m
  ζi,mot (2.10)
One important feature of the forecast equations is that they are based entirely
on variables that will not change with time. Parents’ education and average occu-
pation task intensities are meant to be signals of parental ability and suitability for
occupations that they pass along to their children. Average occupation intensity is
an imperfect measure because it relies on what the parents do (in terms of occupa-
tion history) as a signal for the son’s ability, but since parents’ history is necessarily
truncated at the beginning of the panel and their own parents’ information will not
be available, occupation is still useful information to form the signal.18 Crucially,
though, nothing in the η equations is dependent on where parents are in relation to
the son, or even whether they are still living. It is therefore not meant to include
any networking effect fathers may have on son’s occupation or wages, which I will
add into the wage equation separately.
A key element of η is the forecast error ζ. This ζ is the difference between true
ability η and forecasted ability ηˆ. The agent will rapidly learn his realization of ζi,cog
and ζi,mot, as detailed in Section 2.4.1, but from the perspective of the econometrician
this will always be unobserved and it must be inferred from the son’s outcomes and
decisions how likely he is to have a good draw of the ζ components of ability. It
is also worth noting that while I interpret ζs to be forecast errors on individual
ability that are important to account for in my analysis, it is not a point of emphasis
18 Because parents are older and more established, they are less likely to be observed switching
occupations and may therefore be in better matches than their children, and their occupational
task intensity may be a good signal for their own ability. However, it is true that task intensity is
a characteristic of the parents’ occupation and not of the parents themselves (as education is), and
in future work I would like to test the robustness of the model to alternative measures of parental
ability in the signaling equations.
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how to interpret the φ coefficients. In studying parents’ effects, I am interested in
separating any network effects of wages from other explanations such as non-wage
utility from parents, which is included in Equation 2.7, and parental influence on the
son’s ability, but I am not trying to decompose the process by which parents may
transmit that ability. Therefore, I want to isolate the ζ terms because I assume they
are a point of difference between the agent and econometrician’s information set, but
I do not attempt to provide insight on any mechanisms by which parents may, in
fact, contribute to the production of their son’s ability19.
To account for contemporaneous effects fathers may have in helping their sons find
better wages, I add father’s occupation characteristics directly to the wage equation
in 2.8 to form Equation 2.11.
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19 This is in contrast to a long literature interested in how genetics, environment and schooling
combine to form childhood production functions; see Todd and Wolpin (2003) for an overview. An
interesting point, but well beyond the scope of this paper would be to study young adults who
had reached the same ηs through different combinations of production inputs would have different
location decisions and contemproaneous effects of parents. By using a non-structual signaling
equation for ηs, I am assuming this is not the case.
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Here, I use occupation characteristics crossed with location for the same reasons
as in the descriptive regressions, to measure the possibility that fathers impact sons’
wages in a given occupation and that this may depend on the father’s occupation
and how similar sons’ and fathers’ occupations are. Because equation 2.11 includes
father’s present-day occupation characteristics and location, I interpret any effect
ofβ1f , β2f and β3f as due to networking, whereas significant coefficients of parents
in signaling equations 2.9 or 2.10 above are permanent and are assumed to reflect
transmission of ability through any process that acts before adulthood. Note that this
equation relies on father’s contemporaneous occupation and that fathers and sons are
in the same location `. This will not capture networking effects that may happen at
a distance20, but using variation in relative location and occupation between fathers
and sons builds from the literature in which fathers help sons find work through local
connections and provides scope for separating network effects from transmission of
ability or signaling.
2.4.5 Occupation Switching
In determining counterfactual wages, it is important to know not only what wages
agents expect to earn given an occupation, but what type of occupation an agent
would expect to get if he chose to leave his current occupation (or enter the labor
market, if not currently employed). To this end, I write transition equations for the
next period cognitive and motor task intensities:
cogpji,t 1q  γ0,cog   γ1,cogcogpjitq   γ2,cogmotpjitq   γ3,cogItrempit  1s
 γ4,cogItrH
p  1s   γ5,cogηi,cog   γ6,cogηi,mot
 

γ7,cogcogpj
f
itq   γ8,cogmotpj
f
itq
	
ItrL
f
it  `s   ιit,cog (2.12)
20 For example, in national markets such as law or academia, a father’s network or reputation may
help the son’s prospects in other cities.
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p  1s   γ5,motηi,cog   γ6,motηi,mot
 

γ7,motcogpj
f
itq   γ8,motmotpj
f
itq
	
ItrL
f
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These equations, with independent draws of ιit,cog and ιit,mot, govern how agents
are placed into a new cognitive-motor pair if they choose to separate from their cur-
rent occupation, or for unemployed or non-head workers if they choose to become
employed and a head of household. This transition is based only on current occupa-
tion task intensities, ability, father’s current occupation task intensities and relative
location, and the current employment and headship status of the agent. I include
fathers’ current occupation characteristics in this occupation switching transition in
the same way as the wage equation, allowing for the possibility that through local
network effects fathers might affect not only affect sons’ wages within an occupa-
tion, but may also affect their outcome when switching occupations. In writing the
problem this way, I rely on the simplifying assumptions that the occupation transi-
tion is Markovian, and that agents make the decision to change occupations before
observing the characteristics of their potential new occupation. Under these model
assumptions, I can build expected values for workers’ task intensities conditional on
making an occupation switch, which allows me to compute counterfactual expected
wages for the choice to switch occupations as well as the choice to remain in the
current occupation. An agent who enters the lottery will not know what his ιit,cog
and ιit,mot will be before entry. If he does choose to switch occupations, he receives
his ι draws and enters a new occupation.
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2.4.6 Demographic Transitions
There are a few major dimensions in which agents in the model must form ex-
pectations in order to make decisions. The sources of utility in the model are wages,
proximity to parents and fixed home locations, leisure (non-employment), and inter-
actions of life cycle factors with parents and home location. In making occupation
and employment decisions, the agent must know his wage prospects if he switches
occupation or location. I use the wage and occupation transition equations described
in the previous subsections to allow each agent to form expectations about wages. In
making location decisions, the agent must know something about his parents’ future
decisions, his own likelihood to get married and have children, and how his national
moves are resolved. I describe how I estimate those transitions in this section.
I will not model parents’ decisions or individuals’ marriage and fertility outcomes
directly, but rather I assume these can be characterized by transition probabilities
that can be inferred from the data. In the model, there are two main elements that
make one location more favorable than another. The first is high wages, which are
beneficial to all agents. The second is personal ties to the location, whether it is
the home or parents’ location. In the static case, I treat all these ties as fixed; an
agent has one permanent home location, and parental location decisions are known
to the agent at the time of his own decision-making. In the dynamic case, home is
still fixed, but parents might not be. The agent must account for a possible parental
transition. If locating near parents is valuable either in or out of the labor market,
the value may still be offset if parental mobility is high. It may not be worth the
moving cost to gain the proximity benefits today if they will move away tomorrow.
Parental moves, in the model, are governed by a transition process that I take
from Census data. Since older individuals are not very mobile, there are too few
parental moves in the PSID to reliably estimate parents’ moves. Therefore, I will
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incorporate outside data from the Census to estimate these transitions. I find the
probability of moving for each age and education status using the Census and match
to PSID respondents’ parents age and education to estimate their probability of
moving. Using the same criteria, I determine the likelihood of each destination. For
individuals aged 45-65, the bulk of the parents’ ages in the model, I estimate the
probability of moving as a logit.
P pmovept q  fpage
p
t , HSGrad
p, Collp, CollGradpq (2.14)
My functional form includes coefficients of age, age squared and dummies for high
school graduates, some college (including two year degrees), and four year college
graduates (including graduate degrees), with less than high school omitted.
For destinations, I take the same sample and place them into M+1 locations,
using the M MSAs that have the most observations in the PSID21 and location zero,
which incorporates all others.22 I then build an pM   1qxpM   1q transition matrix
for movers between MSAs using the 1980 and 1990 Census questions about where
individuals lived five years ago, with location five years ago on one axis and current
location on the other. I use the 1980 matrix for years 1976-84 and 1990 for 1985-93.
For movers, I then take the probability of the destination directly from the data,
using the observed moves from the transition matrix.
I use a similar method to determine own destinations when making “national
moves,” the designation I reserve for all moves that are not to home or parents’
location in order to compress the choice set. In the model, an agent that makes a
national move does not know where his best option is going to be, just as an agent
21 Empirically, I use the 20 most common MSAs in order to have sufficient density to estimate
wage dummies by location from the PSID.
22 I do track where precisely individuals live in determining whether they have moved, such that a
move from location zero to a “different zero” is possible, but individuals in M  0 in consecutive
periods have by definition not moved.
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makng an occupation switch does not know what new occupation he will enter.
In order to compute counterfactual wages, I need to have a transition matrix to
determine the probability, given the agent’s current location and education, that a
national move will result in a move to any particular location. Again, to ensure
sufficient density of moves to make this transition matrix, I use the same Census
data. Available Census data is not a perfect analogue to the decision-making that I
model with the PSID, but it does have information on previous location and birth
state. I build an M+1 by M+1 transition matrix on Census moves among 23-3523,
but I eliminate any moves in which the individual’s current location is the birth
state. Because I do not have birth MSA, I use this as a proxy for moves home or to
parents, counting the others as national moves. I use birth state as a proxy for home
location, and thus consider any move whose destination is not birth state a “national
move.” I then use the observed transition probabilities directly as my weighting for
the destination of a national move.
Finally, I assume marriage and fertility, while obviously choices in reality, are
exogenous to the model. For single men in the PSID, I assume likelihood of marriage
depends on age and education, and fertility on age, education and marital status.
For simplicity, I abstract from number and age of children in favor of only whether
the individual has children or not, so the transition is only from childless to having
children. For fertility, I add a dummy for being married.
P pmarit  1|mari,t1  0q  gpageitq (2.15)
P pchildit  1|childi,t1  0q  hpageit,mari,t1q (2.16)
Again, I use logit specifications on quadratics of age, and in this case instead of
including education as a regressor I run the model separately for high school and
23 Because the 1980 and 1990 migration questions ask residence five years ago, I use 23 as a cutoff
point so that my moves are for individuals going from 18-23 on the younger end and 30-35 on the
older end.
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college graduates. These are not elements of particular interest in the model but
rather are included as controls that can affect the value of living near parents or
home as well as the cost of moving.
2.5 Estimation
I estimate the model separately for the high school graduate and college graduate
PSID samples described in the data section. My estimation strategy will need to
accomplish two major things that are not accounted for in the descriptive regressions
but are built theoretically into the model. First, I will need to jointly estimate
wage and choice parameters, because expected wages affect choices and choices,
particularly the decision whether to live near fathers, affect expected wages and
occupation. Second, I will need to estimate the likelihood each individual takes on
certain values of unobserved parameters ζ and θ, which affect wage and occupation
switching. Before I discuss the implementation of the estimation procedure, I will
discuss how each of these factors help to address selectivity problems that would
otherwise be present in my analysis.
One key element is that by embedding the wage equation into a full choice model,
I will be able to evaluate the wage effects from parents that remain after accounting
for a non-wage preference for living near parents that can cause accepted wages to
be lower in the same location as parents. Unadjusted data and descriptive regres-
sions provide a combination of both the preference and any network or other labor
market effects. Greater detail of parental wage effects are added by allowing parents’
characteristics to enter separately in the forecast of abilities ηi,cog and ηi,mot, in direct
effects on the wage and occupation transition equations when proximate, and via
compensating differentials through the choice utility parameters. This is one of the
most important ways in which the model builds on the existing literature, as most
papers are either interested in mechanisms by which family members can affect job
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outcomes directly, or else are accounting for preference-based family ties as a sepa-
rate reason for migration from labor market reasons. The joint estimation of wages
and choices allows me to measure both.
However, the point above holds for any choice model. The next question is what
do I gain by including unobserved heterogeneity parameters. The match quality θij
is important for several reasons. Individuals with better occupation matches tend to
stay in their occupations longer, meaning that a match quality term is vital to getting
unbiased estimates of return to tenure24. In my model, the occupation switching
decision is influenced by match quality and by parents. Individuals tend to switch
occupations either because they expect a switch to place them in an occupation
where they are better matched or because they expect a switch to place them an
occupation with better characteristics, and both of these can affect the estimation
of parents’ effects. When agents first enter the labor market, they may shop around
occupations until they find a good match, and at the same time they are at the
ages where they have the highest rates of making geographic moves. Individuals in
their late twenties and early thirties are more likely than younger individuals to have
relocated away from parents and also to be established in good occupation matches,
which could cause biased estimates of network effect of parents as well as returns to
tenure and experience if match quality is not adjusted for. In certain cases, I will
also show in the results that fathers living near sons affect the occupation transition
equation positively, meaning that individuals near fathers have more to gain from
switching occupations and therefore their switches will be less likely to be driven
by poor θij draws. Like the age profiles, this will cause individuals near fathers to
have lower average match qualities than those who are not, which would cause a
model without θ parameters to underestimate fathers’ effects on wages within an
24 Using jobs instead of occupations, Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991) and Altonji and
Williams (2005) are three classic examples using this basic structure in the returns to seniority
literature.
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occupation.
It is also important to correctly account for the forecast errors ζi,cog and ζi,mot.
The biggest reason these are important to my parameter estimates is that the returns
to individual ability can be different by proximity to parents if proximity to parents
correlates with other outcomes. In my wage equation, ηi,cog and ηi,mot, the overall
measures of individual ability, are in the wage equation only interacted with occupa-
tional task intensity and household headship status. If fathers in the same location
can help place sons into more task-intense occupations, then individuals with high
ηs will be more likely to stay near parents than those with low ηs, which must be
adjusted for when calculating the network effect of parents. Moreover, if fathers’
ability to affect occupation varies by education, as I show evidence for in Section 2.6,
then the difference in differences in wages by education and proximity to parents will
be partly due to differences in geographic sorting on ability between high school and
college graduates. Because I assume that ζs are forecast errors in Equations 2.9 and
2.10, they are random factors in the model. Since they are independent of the other
variables in η, the same reasons for why ηs may be different by proximity to parents
and by education holds for ζ. If I did not include ζi,cog and ζi,mot, wage differences
due to these sorting of ζs would be incorrectly be attributed to network effects or
other parameters of the model.
The implementation of the estimation procedure uses the EM algorithm as de-
scribed in Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) in order to estimate all parameters including
discrete unobserved heterogeneity types ζ and θ, using a conditional choice proba-
bility framework developed by Hotz and Miller (1993). The basic method of the
algorithm is as follows. I begin by assuming a probability that each individual in
the data has given unobserved ability inputs ζi,cog and ζi,mot and occupation match
θ (each taking on one of a discrete number of values; for each individual i, these
inputs are collectively denoted the unobserved type of individual i). With these
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values in hand, the parameters that govern the wage, occupation transition, and
choice parameters can be estimated. Then, given the estimated wage and occupa-
tion transition parameters, the conditional likelihood of individual i making each
choice can be estimated if he has any given combination of values for ζi,cog, ζi,mot
and θ. Given the relative likelihoods and the estimated population distribution of
types, every individual’s probability of being each unobserved type is updated, at
which point the population probabilities for each type are also updated. The model
is then estimated again under the new estimated type probabilities, and the process
is continued until convergence of type probabilities across consecutive maximization
steps. In the identification section below, I will discuss more intuitively how this
process can separately identify the model parameters.
To make location and occupation switching choices, agents must form expecta-
tions of their wages in each scenario. In the model, expected wages are built in
three parts. The first part is the wage equation, which is estimated to determine any
individual’s wages conditional on occupation, unobserved type, father’s occupation
characteristics when in the same location, and control variables experience, tenure,
location and calendar year. The second part is the occupation transition equation,
which determines expected cognitive and motor intensity of the new occupation for
location or occupation switchers. The third part is the location transition for na-
tional moves, which affects the expected location component of wages for individuals
who make national moves. I take this from external data.
The wage equation is estimated by maximum likelihood. As shown in the previous
section, this is necessary because of the interactions between cognitive and motor
task intensity and the partially unobserved ability measure which is permanent to
an individual across time and occupations. It is also notable that the form of the wage
equation allows for returns to experience and tenure to vary with an occupation’s
skill intensity.
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The occupation transition equations are estimated by OLS. An occupation is
treated as a cognitive and motor skill intensity pair, and the two intensities are
determined by previous occupation, permanent ability, and father’s occupation when
in the same location. This allows for two channels in which father’s occupation can
affect expected wages: he may affect his son’s wages within an occupation, and he
may affect the characteristics of the occupation the son expects to work in relative
to what he would find in another location.
With these parameter values, the agent can predict the expected value of his
wage by supplying his labor in any of the markets he can choose to move to. For
national moves, the expectation is taken both over wages in each possible labor
market incorporated into the national option as well as the probability of a national
move resulting in the agent’s move to each of the possible markets. Recall that in any
option requiring a job change, the agent does not observe his permanent job match
θ before making his decision, but he does know the θ associated with his current
occupation. His expected wage for each choice can then be used to maximize the
likelihood of the choice equation.
The choice parameters are then estimated by maximum likelihood using the esti-
mated wages from the previous step. The other utility parameters are moving costs,
job switching costs, utility from not working or not forming an independent household
and the value of living in the fixed home location or parents’ location. In the model,
employment, household formation, occupation and location mobility are determined
by choices whereas parental movement and mortality, as well as the individual’s own
marital and fertility status, are governed by transition processes. The model can be
written using conditional choice probabilities and using finite dependence.
48
2.5.1 Identification
At this point, I will take a step back from the details of the estimation routine
to discuss the variation in the data that allows the main model parameters to be
estimated. First, I consider the wage equation. There are unobserved types entered
into this equation unique to an individual (ζ) and to an occupation-location spell
(θ). The panel data and mobility decisions of an individual help us attribute wage
variation to these factors. An individual who changes occupations and has relatively
favorable wages when in a more cognitive or motor-intense occupation is likely to
have high ability in that area. Similarly, an agent whose wages are higher compared
to his observed attributes after an occupation move is likely to have had a relatively
unfavorable wage draw in the former occupation compared to the current occupation.
When wages are similar before and after, this is more likely attributable to permanent
ability. There is also information to be gained from a lack of occupational mobility.
An individual who stays in one occupation for a long time probably has a favorable
wage draw, especially when the job attributes are not good and there would otherwise
be an apparent wage gain to switching.
Location decisions primarily identify moving costs and the value of home and
parents. The majority of individuals begin in their home location, so rates of initial
moves combine these effects. The value of parents can be inferred in part from the
high rate of return moves, in which an individual who has left in an earlier period
returns to the origin location in a later period. This behavior is hard to rationalize
without a preference for home or family since an income-maximizing incentive for
moving will rarely result in a market worth migrating out of in one period subse-
quently becoming one worth returning to in the future. The other major factor in
measuring parental value is by comparing individuals by parental mortality; when
parents are not present, individuals should face similar moving costs and similar non-
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parental values for their home location, such as other friends and social networks, as
well as familiarity with and tastes for home, but will not have the same benefits in or
out of the labor market that parents provide. While mobility among older people is
low, there is also some variation by parental moves to distinguish home and parents.
Occupation switching costs are identified from the rate of occupation switches and
the potential wage growth from switching. In the model, there are several reasons
for an occupation change to affect wages. First, occupation characteristics enter the
wage equation directly. There is an intercept shifter depending on task intensity, and
task intensties also affect the returns to tenure and experience. This can encourage
workers to stay in high task intensity occupations and switch out of low-intensity
occupations. Second, switching occupations resets occupation tenure and job spell-
specific match quality θ. Tenure is likely to lead to workers remaining in their
current occupations, whereas the match quality will provide staying or switching
incentives based on the draw. Overall, the expected effect in the absence of any
costs to occupation switching is to see rapid turnover in the first few years until an
occupation with good characteristics and a good match quality is found, and then
very low mobility thereafter. The switching cost is essentially a measure of how much
slower that process occurs than would be seen if occupational moves were free.
2.5.2 Estimating Equation
In this section, I derive the estimating equation I will use in the maximization
step. Under the assumptions of additively separable flow utility, discussed in the
model section, and Markovian updating of the state variables, which comes from
my first step estimation of transition probabilities, then I only need conditional
independence of the state variables x and error term ε in order to write the value of
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a choice lit in a particular state as a Bellman equation:
25
Vtpxit, εplitqq  maxrvtpxit, litq   εplitqs (2.17)
In this equation, vt represents the flow utility plus the discounted value of Vt 1
(whose value is summed over state transitions and integrated over errors). I employ
a common strategy and assume i.i.d Type I Extreme Value errors, along with a
discount factor δ that I will set equal to .95, which produces the functional form
below.
vtpxit, litq  utpxit, litq   δ
¸
xi,t 1
lnr
J¸
j1
exppvt 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  jqsqpxi,t 1|xit, litq(2.18)
This equation can be expanded by multiplying and dividing by the value of mak-
ing a particular choice of li,t 1, where the choice is a combination of location and
occupation switching decision. The expansion can be similarly expanded based on
the value of a choice of li,t 2. This can be done any finite number of times until
the current choice lit makes no difference to the last value term. At that point, the
future value is independent of the current choice. Then the expanded values of any
two contemporaneous choices can be differenced, and by making a normalization I
can write a utility function that is dependent only on utility parameters, transition
probabilities, choice probabilities, and the discount rate.
Consider an agent making choice k. The value term can be expanded as follows:
25 This section closely follows Bishop’s (2008) application of the Hotz and Miller conditional choice
probability estimation method to a similar location choice problem to this paper’s.
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vtpxit, lit  kq 
utpxit, lit  kq
 δ
¸
xi,t 1
lnr
J¸
j1
exppvt 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  jq  exppvt 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  hqs
qpxi,t 1|xit, lit  kq
 δ
¸
xi,t 1
rut 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  hqsqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  kq
 δ2
¸
xi,t 1
¸
xi,t 2
lnr
J¸
j1
exppvt 2pxi,t 2, li,t 2  jq  exppvt 2pxi,t 2, li,t 2  gqs
qpxi,t 2|xi,t 1, li,t 1  hqqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  kq
 δ2
¸
xi,t 1
¸
xi,t 2
rvt 2pxi,t 2, li,t 2  gqs
qpxi,t 2|xi,t 1, li,t 1  hqqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  kq (2.19)
The
°
xi,t 1
lnr
J°
j1
exppvt 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  jq exppvt 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  hqs term is the
inverse of the choice probability of choosing phq conditional on xi,t 1. To get the
normalized value, the same equation shown for choosing pkq can be written for an
alternate choice paq. Since there is no memory of match qualities in the model, the
value of choosing g in period t   2 will not depend on the initial choice. Therefore,
subtracting the equations and substituting in the choice probability yields:
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vtpxit, lit  kq  vtpxit, lit  aq 
utpxit, lit  kq  utpxit, lit  aq
 δ
¸
xi,t 1
lnrP pli,t 1  h|xi,t 1q
1sqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  kq
δ
¸
xi,t 1
lnrP pli,t 1  h|xi,t 1q
1sqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  aq
 δ
¸
xi,t 1
rut 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  hqsqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  kq
δ
¸
xi,t 1
rut 1pxi,t 1, li,t 1  hqsqpxi,t 1|xit, lit  aq (2.20)
This equation only includes utilities, choice probabilities and transition probabilities.
Since the latter two are estimated in a first stage, I can find the structural parameters
in the utility equation that maximize the likelihood of the observed choices in the
PSID. In particular, I use agents choosing to make a national move and make the
opposite employment choice in period t   1 as period t (choice h) and then make a
move home and choose to be not employed in period t 2 (choice g). This will result
in the period t   3 choice to be dependent only on attributes of the home location
and individual ability, as is necessary for finite dependence.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Wages
The wage results, summarized in Table 2.9, show that fathers in the same location
can have an impact on high school graduates. There is a significant positive effect
of the father’s cognitive task intensity and son’s wage when the two are in the same
location, but there is no significant effect for college graduates. There is also a smaller
negative effect for father’s motor intensity which is significant for both high school
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and college graduates.
This is in contrast to the descriptive results, in which father’s cognitive task
intensity in the same location had a strong positive correlation with both high school
and college graduates’ wages, with the point estimate being significantly higher for
college graduates. It appears from the final wage results that for college graduates,
the correlation found in the descriptive regressions was due not to direct effects of
fathers, but for high school graduates, direct effects were a significant reason for the
correlation.
Interestingly, the patterns for returns to experience and occupation tenure differ
by education group. For high school graduates, there is a high return to tenure in
cognitive-intense occupations, but for the college group cognitive-intense occupations
offer a very high return to general experience. This is noteworthy because college
graduates may therefore have more incentive to change occupations during their
career where high school graduates in a good occupation may want to hold their job
and reap the benefits of their tenure-specific gain.
2.6.2 Occupations
The occupation transition results, seen in Table 2.10, also vary with education.
Once again, fathers with high cognitive intensity may be able help their high school
graduate sons. In this case, sons in the same location as fathers tend to obtain better
(more cognitive-intense) jobs when fathers have high cognitive task intensity. There
appears to be no effect in motor intensity of any father’s occupation characteristics,
and if anything the effect is slightly negative for college graduate sons. In all cases,
previous occupation’s task intensity has a significant effect, but the relationship is
stronger for college graduates.
The combined effect of father’s cognitive intensity on occupation and within-
occupation wages of high school graduates is economically as well as statistically
54
significant. A one standard deviation raise in father’s cognitive task intensity is
associated with a 0.061 increase in the log of son’s wages when in the same location.
At average wages, this is a raise of $1721 a year.
2.6.3 Choices
The choice parameters can be described in several ways. One simple way is to
use the relative coefficients on wage and other utility parameters to calculate the
implied dollar value of various amenities in the model, which I do in Table 2.11.
Evaluated at the mean of wages, the implied moving costs for single high school and
college graduates are each around $5000 to $7000. Agents with families face moving
costs that are roughly twice as high. Parents have a very high utility value as well,
equivalent to $16,000 annually for single college graduates and $18,000 for high school
graduates. This value declines by 30-40% for married individuals without children,
but then rises again once children are born. There is a lesser, but still very significant,
utility value for living in the fixed home MSA. This value increases somewhat with
marriage and children.
Before using the model to make counterfactual predictions, I will compare my
dollar-valued results to other structural parameters estimated by migration models
of sequences of choices. The purpose of this exercise is to both to compare my results
to those found by studies with similar empirical implementations and also to discuss
where some of the differences I find highlight areas of my model that are not the
same as previous works. My points of comparison will be with Kennan and Walker
and Bishop, both of whom estimated their models from NLSY7926 data, and Gemici
who, like myself, used the PSID.
All of the above models included a “home bonus,” in which individuals received a
utility benefit from being in their home location. These are defined differently based
26 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979
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on the definition of location and data availability, but all the studies estimated the
value of the home bonus to range from about $10,000 to $25,000 when normalized
to the same inflator I am using. None of the studies used parental location in their
analysis. My finding of parents + home on the utility parameters are in this same
range, which since parents are usually in the home location makes sense. However,
my results indicate that keeping track of parents’ location is a good idea when data
permits, since they provide the majority of the value in my model that would other-
wise be largely attributed to a home bonus.
Another feature I share with the other models is a geographic moving cost. In
all cases, this parameter is not strongly interpreted and mostly is included to help
match the relative paucity of long-distance moves observed annually. However, the
other models I compare to tend to obtain a much higher moving cost than I do, and
while it is not a primary coefficient of interest, it is still informative to consider more
closely why this occurs. To get a scope for how large this difference is, the previous
models discussed in the last two paragraphs all estimate moving costs at somewhere
around $300,000 whereas I find these costs to be around $10,000.
This difference occurs for two primary reasons, one of which is a technical con-
sequence of a modeling choice I make and the other of which comes from a more
substantiative theoretical difference. The technical reason is due to my collapsing
of all alternative choices besides home or parents’ location into a National move
choice, which means that my agents make their choices over five to eleven choices
rather than fifty states or MSAs as in Bishop or Kennan and Walker, meaning there
are less error draws to make a move relatively favorable27 Bishop notes that in her
model, the cost of being forced to move in a period is over $100,000 less if the agent
is allowed to move to his most favored choice rather than an arbitrary location. This
27 Gemici uses nine Census regions, but her model is reliant on receiving a single outside job offer
at a time which makes it somewhat different than the others in this way. Still, her moving cost is
more in line with those papers’ than with mine.
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interpretation is more comparable to my intuition of choosing to make a national
move and then being assigned probabilistically to the best choice among the possible
destinations, but even then it makes her moving cost around twenty times higher
than mine rather than thirty times higher.
The substantive reason is that my model, unlike the comparison models, incorpo-
rates moves across occupations as well as locations. In particular, this is important
because my comparison models do not use occupation, and therefore view job match
quality (θ in my notation) as permanent to a location spell, whereas I use a location-
occupation spell. This has clear consequences for the interpretation of geographic
moves. In a model where a bad match can only be reset with a location move, or else
a bad match will have lifelong wage consequences, there must be a large countervail-
ing cost in order to rationalize low mobility rates with an apparently strong motive
to move. In particular, there may be a large pool of workers who wish to receive the
“home bonus” but also face a poor match in their home location which may offset
some of the gains, with moving away and then back the only chance to recover the
home bonus and shed the poor wage match. In my model, a much less costly (and,
in reality as well as the model, a much more common) way to serve the resetting
purpose is to make an occupational switch, which removes the need for a very large
“catch-all” cost to set against the lower wages that come from poor matches. This
allows me to combine the large-scale framework of the models I compare to with
the intuition of studies like Corak and Piraino or Kramarz and Skans, which are
interested in the local transmission of occupation. While I do not think that the
moving costs are a primary coefficient of interest in my model or the models in the
literature I build on, what is interesting is that my decrease in moving costs did not
correspond to a decrease in parent/home preferences. I view this as support that
my preference for parents terms are not serving this catch-all purpose in the model
and that their large significance corresponds to actual value for young workers to live
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near their parents.
2.6.4 Counterfactuals
Perhaps a more intuitive way to think about the results is in terms of effects each
channel have on the main results of the model. I will consider two basic types of
counterfactual scenarios. First, I look at expected wages for counterfactual location
decisions of individuals to determine how these affect the observed wage gap between
those who live near parents or not for the high school and college groups. Next, I
look at the effect of shutting down various elements of the model by computing
counterfactual decisions. Within the model, I calculate the effect on wages and
migration rates.
At the beginning of the paper, I noted that there is a large difference in differences
between high school and college graduates’ relative wages when leaving near parents
or elsewhere. I will use the model to examine the relative importance of three factors
in accounting for this differential effect of proximity to parents. In each case, I will
change relevant parameters of the model to essentially shut down the impact of one
aspect of the model. I use the adjusted parameters to simulate individual location-
occupation decisions and compute predicted wages. Then, I compare results from
that outcome to Table 2.7. Looking at the MSA section of Table 2.7, I see that high
school graduates’ wages (for household heads only) are 0.058 higher when in the
same MSA as their parents, but college graduates’ are 0.109 lower, for a difference
in difference of 0.167. In the following counterfactuals, I consider how much of that
value can be explained by the tested effect.
A first consideration is what I have termed the networking effect, which is the
direct effect of father’s occupation intensities and distance on son’s wages and oc-
cupation transitions. I therefore set these effects to zero and recalculate predicted
wages under these conditions. Formally, the coefficients I set to zero are β1f , β2f and
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β3f in Equation 2.11 and γ7,cog, γ8,cog, γ7,mot and γ8,mot in Equations 2.12 and 2.13. I
find that this lowers log wages for high school graduates by 0.021 when near fathers,
accounting for about 13% of the difference in differences from Table 2.7. I interpret
this as the contribution of networking effects to the difference in differences of high
school and college graduates’ wage effects of proximity to parents.
A second consideration is occupation switching costs. I find larger occupation
switching costs for college graduates than high school graduates. Occupation switches
can be an important part of wage growth for both groups, albeit often for different
reasons. Switches tend to improve occupational characteristics for high school grad-
uates more than for college graduates. Within my model, this occurs in part because
college graduates are likelier to start in high task intensity occupations, leaving less
room to move up the ladder by switching under the process I am using, and also
because father’s effects on occupation are significant and positive only for cognitive
intensity of high school graduates’ occupation. On the other hand, the wage equation
suggests that occupation tenure interacted with cognitive intensity tends to be more
beneficial for high school graduates, meaning college graduates who are not in good
occupations or who do not have good matches have less occupation-specific capital
to lose and may therefore see especially large gains from switching early in their ca-
reers. To determine the relative importance of these features, I re-calculate predicted
wages in the scenario in which occupation switching costs (α5) are zero. Overall, I
find free occupation switching to be particularly beneficial for college graduates in
the home location, accounting for a total of about 0.03 of the difference in differences
for a further 18% of wage effects.
Third, I want to consider that there may be a difference in characteristics between
individuals who stay at home and those who move, and what impact that may have
on wage differentials. There are a few ways in which people near or not near their
parents may differ. They may be different by age, experience, occupation tenure,
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ability η and match quality θ, and whether they are likely to live in a high-wage
area. Those near parents also have the direct effects of fathers to affect their wages.
In order to even out these factors, I perform the following counterfactual. I
compute predicted wages for each individual observed working in my data under the
scenario in which they had chosen to make a national move. Enforcing a national
move resets occupation tenure and match quality, ensures individuals are not near
parents and essentially equalizes geographic wage benefit. Any remaining difference
between those who, in actuality, chose to live near parents instead of elsewhere can
be attributed to differences in experience and ability. I will jointly consider those
factors to be differential selection of movers.
High school graduates who were in their father’s location have an expected log
wage 0.027 higher after a forced national move than those who do not currently live
near their father28, whereas for college graduates the expected wage of those in the
same location is 0.018 lower. I interpret this to be the difference in earnings potential
between those near and not near parents, whether by experience, ability or current
occupational status. The result indicates that among college graduates, those who
move away from parents have slightly higher earnings potential, but for high school
graduates, the stayers have higher earnings potential. The difference in differences
of 0.045 accounts for about 27% of the difference in differences in the groups’ overall
wage difference by father’s location as shown in Table 2.7. I call this result is the
differential selection of movers by education group.
These three factors account for a little over half of the differences in outcomes
between movers and stayers across education groups. Other factors which may con-
tribute as well include differential preferences for parents, moving costs and geo-
graphic wage dispersion. I find preferences for parents and moving costs to be similar
in parameter estimates, and so I expect that incentive to be similar across groups.
28 This is only for those whose father is in the data.
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However, the difference in base wages across locations is different, and therefore
staying near parents or costs to move will be balanced against different wage oppor-
tunities.
I can also use counterfactuals to consider effects on migration rates. Earlier in the
results section, I put the value of preference to live near parents in dollar terms, but
I can alternatively demonstrate the utility value of parents by measuring how much
they affect migration. When shutting down preferences for parents entirely in the
model, I calculate that college graduates’ inter-MSA moving rates would rise from
about 13.3% annually among household heads to 19.5%, with a corresponding rise
from about 9% to 14% for high school graduates, around a 50% increase in mobility
in both cases. These results show how important parents are to internal migration
decisions of young workers, and therefore to the overall geographic mobility of the
workforce.
2.7 Conclusions and Future Work
In the initial sections of this paper, I examine the basic relationships between
father’s characteristics and second-generation PSID respondents. One key data fea-
ture is that high school graduates who live in the same labor market as their parents
tend to have equal or higher wages than those who do not, whereas college graduates
in the same location have lower wages. This could be due to differences in ability,
preferences for parents, or labor market advantages of parents between education
groups. I touch on various literatures that offer partial explanations for this result
and show that my basic data is in line with what others have used. In descriptive re-
gressions, I show that interactions of parental location and occupation characteristics
correlates with individuals’ wage and occupation outcomes. When I use a continuous
(Yamaguchi) measure to characterize occupations, I find that cognitive task intensity
is strongly and consistently associated with higher wages. Father’s cognitive inten-
61
sity is also associated with higher wages and higher cognitive intensity for the son’s
occupation. This effect is strongest when father and son share a location, a result
which holds at the state or MSA level.
I then move to a model of location and occupation choice to determine the relative
importance of potential channels in determining wages. I am interested in direct
parental effects on wages of nearby adult children, preferences among those children
for living near their parents, and the possible effect that comes from similarity in
ability across generations. I find that father’s cognitive task intensity has a positive
impact on wages and also on own cognitive task intensity for occupation switchers. I
find that this impact of fathers, differences in relative ability of migrants, and higher
occupational switching costs for college graduates all contribute to the educational
difference in relative wages. The utility parameter associated with living near parents
is very high but of a similar value for both groups, which means that differential
preferences or amounts of non-labor resource sharing are probably not a key reason
for this difference. However, these preferences do play a large role in the amount of
migration. I estimate that annual internal migration rates would be 50% higher in
each education group if parental preferences did not exist.
There are several extensions I would like to pursue in this work. One point of
emphasis would be to use the full set of PSID waves, most recently through 2009. I
plan to test the sensitivity of the model estimates to restrictions that emulate data
available in more recent waves of the PSID. In particular, the most important issues
are the loss of information resulting from biennial surveys29 and the presence of only
one “PSID-gened” parent30. Provided the results are not overly sensitive to this, or
that additional modeling can help correct areas in which the model is sensitive to
29 From 1997-present, survey data is only collected in odd-numbered years.
30 Individuals who are third-generation or higher will have one parent who is not part of a PSID
family, and may not be followed upon the death or divorce of their spouse. In this case, I will not
have certain information about proximity to parents as I do for second-generation individuals
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lack of data, I plan to estimate the model for PSID waves in recent years31.
Another area of interest is to extend the family information I use. The primary
non co-resident relationship of economic interest in this paper is between parents and
adult children, but the genealogical nature of the PSID makes it possible to study
other relationships as well. While PSID respondents’ spouses families are not tracked,
there is some information in some waves about their parents and origins, so there
is some scope for studying how in-laws affect location decisions and labor market
outcomes compared to parents. There is also the possibility of testing how siblings’
occupations and locations affect each other’s choices, since the literature has shown
evidence siblings may make decisions strategically. With parents’ characteristics
having been established to matter to young adults both in and out of the labor
market, a broader study of the family’s role may be warranted.
31 As of July 2013, I have preliminary estimates which suggest the model can be adapted to the
newer waves and that results are substantiavely similar using recent waves to the historical 1976-93
waves in this paper
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Whether Individual Lives in Home MSA
Age Range  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
18-23 82.5% 87.2% 85.5% 87.2% 86.2%
24-29 78.4% 77.5% 70.4% 53.5% 69.4%
30-35 78.7% 75.2% 68.3% 39.6% 63.1%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
Table 2.2: Annual Inter-MSA Move Rates
Age Range  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
18-23 8.3% 6.8% 8.1% 8.2% 7.6%
24-29 9.9% 8.0% 9.4% 14.8% 10.4%
30-35 3.6% 6.0% 5.9% 9.3% 6.8%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
Table 2.3: Inter-MSA Moves by Age 30
Proportion of Individuals Moving Between 18-30
  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
% Moved 32.7% 34.1% 34.1% 53.6% 39.9%
Number of Moves (If Any Moves by 30)
  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
One 43.6% 35.4% 32.8% 35.3% 35.4%
Two 35.9% 31.0% 41.8% 26.0% 31.8%
Three or More 20.5% 33.5% 25.4% 38.6% 32.8%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
Table 2.4: Son’s Educational Achievment by Father’s Education
Father’s Education
Son’s Achievement   HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
  HS Grad 22.0% 6.3% 3.7% 1.0% 9.0%
HS Grad 47.2% 41.3% 30.1% 14.6% 35.3%
Some Coll 19.3% 26.6% 38.5% 24.9% 25.9%
Coll Grad 11.5% 25.9% 27.6% 59.5% 29.7%
Overall 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
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Table 2.5: Correlations in Cognitive and Motor Task Intensities
Own Cog Own Mot Father’s Cog Father’s Mot
Own Cog 1 X X X
Own Mot -0.1931 1 X X
Father’s Cog 0.5805 -0.1094 1 X
Father’s Mot -0.1336 0.4768 -0.2505 1
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
Table 2.6: Task Intensity Regression Coefficients: Dependent
Variable Cognitive Intensity
HS Grad Coll Grad
Location: State
Father’s -0.0752 *** -0.0395 ***
Father’s Cog x Diff Loc 0.2636 *** 0.3323 ***
Father’s Cog x Same Loc 0.5545 *** 0.4109 ***
Father’s Mot x Diff Loc 0.3425 *** 0.1277 ***
Father’s Mot x Same Loc 0.1022 *** 0.0385 **
Location: MSA
Father’s -0.0428 ** 0.0052
Father’s Cog x Diff Loc 0.3552 *** 0.2313 ***
Father’s Cog x Same Loc 0.5627 *** 0.4725 ***
Father’s Mot x Diff Loc 0.2267 *** 0.1237 ***
Father’s Mot x Same Loc 0.1036 *** -0.0008
Controls include own motor intensity, marriage/fertility, age, father’s ed-
ucation
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
65
Table 2.7: Wages and Location of Father, Men 18-35
Hourly Inflation-Adjusted Log Wages
Household Heads Only
  HS HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad
State
Same Location 2.414 2.639 2.712 2.832
Diff Location 2.586 2.623 2.789 3.059
Same - Diff -0.172 0.016 -0.077 -0.227
% in Same Loc 85.4% 84.7% 78.8% 60.8%
MSA
Same Location 2.415 2.653 2.721 2.857
Diff Location 2.497 2.594 2.740 2.965
Same - Diff -0.083 0.058 -0.019 -0.109
% in Same Loc 70.6% 72.6% 61.8% 41.2%
Adjustment to 2007 dollars using CPI
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
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Table 2.8: Wage Regression Coefficients, MSA Level
Wage Regression Coefficients: Dependent Var Ln(Wage)
HS Grad Coll Grad
Model 1 (3.4):
Father’s MSA -0.0136 -0.1169 ***
Model 2 (3.5):
Father’s MSA -0.0277 -0.1719 ***
Cognitive 0.0843 * 0.583 ***
Motor 0.0229 -0.1258 ***
Model 3 (3.6):
Father’s MSA 0.0049 -0.1995 ***
Cognitive 0.0752 0.5528 ***
Motor -0.007 -0.1665 ***
Father’s Cog 0.159 *** 0.23 ***
Father’s Mot 0.0139 -0.0297
Model 4 (3.6):
Father’s MSA 0.0996 -0.6906 ***
Cognitive 0.0742 0.5458 ***
Motor -0.0093 -0.1458 ***
Father’s Cog x Diff Loc 0.0636 -0.0508
Father’s Cog x Same Loc 0.1856 *** 0.6195 ***
Father’s Mot x Diff Loc 0.2086 * -0.0313
Father’s Mot x Same Loc -0.0491 0.0114
Model 5 (3.6):
Father’s MSA 0.1278 -0.9441 ***
Cognitive 0.0678 0.5646 ***
Motor 0.005 -0.1351 **
Father’s Cog x Diff Loc 0.0199 -0.1076
Father’s Cog x Same Loc 0.1587 ** 0.7315 ***
Father’s Mot x Diff Loc 0.2112 * -0.018
Father’s Mot x Same Loc -0.0268 -0.0193
Occ. Distance x Diff Loc 0.21 * -0.132
Occ. Distance x Same Loc 0.0926 0.2976 ***
“Same/Diff Loc as Father” Location are at the level of MSA
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
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Table 2.9: Full Model - Wage Coefficients
Wage Coefficients
HS College
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Cognitive 0.068 0.1218 -0.1604 0.1026
Motor 0.0211 0.1004 0.1731 0.137
Exper*Cog 0.0562 0.0284 0.1577 0.0263
Exper2*Cog -0.001 0.0018 -0.007 0.0021
Exper*Mot 0.0343 0.0225 -0.0001 0.0364
Exper2*Mot -0.0002 0.0015 0.0018 0.003
Tenure*Cog 0.1533 0.0531 -0.0289 0.0347
Tenure2*Cog -0.0393 0.0102 0.0062 0.0058
Tenure*Mot -0.0098 0.0384 0.1784 0.0517
Tenure2*Mot 0.015 0.007 -0.0242 0.0088
Exper*Non-Head 0.0096 0.0154 0.2288 0.0255
Exper2*Non-head 0.0027 0.0014 -0.0151 0.0032
Same Loc*Father’s Cog 0.2407 0.0416 -0.0642 0.0397
Same Loc*Father’s Mot -0.169 0.0325 -0.1405 0.0465
Same Loc*F. Occ. Distance 0.1142 0.0396 -0.0714 0.052
θ 0.0564 0.0278 0.1346 0.0355
ηc*Cog -0.0399 0.0196 0.0556 0.0177
ηm*Mot -0.0166 0.0184 -0.0748 0.0223
ηc*Non-head 0.0146 0.0931 -0.1576 0.1179
ηm*Non-head -0.0581 0.1038 0.1031 0.1049
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Table 2.10: Full Model - Occ. Transition Coefficients
Occupation Transition Coefficients
Cognitive Intensity
HS College
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Constant 0.3856 0.0256 0.5174 0.0279
Prev. Cognitive 0.1327 0.0227 0.2762 0.0285
Prev. Motor 0.0107 0.0267 -0.014 0.0212
Prev. Unemp 0.0066 0.0212 0.166 0.0255
ηc 0.0534 0.0397 -0.0377 0.0225
ηm -0.0534 0.0463 0.0506 0.0209
Same Loc*Father’s Cog 0.1246 0.0289 -0.0527 0.0195
Same Loc*Father’s Mot -0.0868 0.0269 -0.016 0.0217
Motor Intensity
HS College
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Constant 0.4907 0.0222 0.3155 0.0388
Prev. Cognitive -0.0529 0.0197 -0.0333 0.0396
Prev. Motor 0.2228 0.0232 0.2518 0.0295
Prev. Unemp 0.1094 0.0184 0.0889 0.0355
ηc -0.0036 0.0345 0.0327 0.0313
ηm 0.0047 0.0402 -0.0187 0.029
Same Loc*Father’s Cog 0.012 0.0251 -0.0406 0.0272
Same Loc*Father’s Mot 0.0172 0.0233 0.0342 0.0302
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Table 2.11: Full Model - Utility Parameters
Utility Parameters
HS College
Coeff. SE $ value Coeff. SE $ value
Wage 4.0587 0.0268 4.0396 0.031
Moving Cost 0.7677 0.0146 4961 0.7814 0.0083 6647
Move*married 0.5746 0.0294 3713 0.4856 0.0173 4131
Move*kids 0.3078 0.0271 1989 0.2122 0.0218 1805
Occ Switching Cost 0.0841 0.0013 543 0.1269 0.0019 1080
Same Loc. As Parent 2.7774 0.059 17947 1.9693 0.0353 16753
Parent*married -1.1276 0.1033 -7286 -0.6121 0.0705 -5207
Parent*kid 0.1381 0.0918 892 -0.1183 0.08 -1006
Home Location 0.4865 0.0206 3144 0.2014 0.0152 1713
Home*married 0.3348 0.0449 2163 0.2619 0.0344 2228
Home*kids 0.1661 0.0451 1073 0.2694 0.044 2292
Not Working 8.1238 0.1898 8.8803 0.2648
Non-head 2.4024 0.0399 2.3749 0.1187
NW*NH 3.6384 0.0103 3.2229 0.0185
Implied dollar value in 2007 dollars, calculated at mean wages for given educa-
tion group
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3Affirmative Action and University Fit:
Evidence from Proposition 209
3.1 Introduction
The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled on the constitutionality of race-based pref-
erences (affirmative action) in university admissions.1 The Court’s ruling hinged on
whether the University’s admissions policies was a narrowly tailored use of race-based
criteria previously established, and did not affirm or overrule the constitutionality of
previous decisions, thus making likely that affirmative action will continue to inspire
substantial political and social debate. One of the arguments opponents of affirma-
tive action have advanced is that affirmative action actually hurts the individuals
it is supposed to help – the mismatch hypothesis. According to the mismatch hy-
pothesis, affirmative action in admissions leads to underrepresented minorities being
admitted to colleges with entering credentials that are significantly lower than their
non-minority counterparts resulting in the minority students not being competitive.2
1 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas on October
10, 2012 and decided on the case on June 24, 2013.
2 See the debate over mismatch effects in law schools in Sander (2004, 2005a, 2005b), Ayres and
Brooks (2005), Ho (2005), Chambers et. al. (2005), Barnes (2007) and Rothstein and Yoon (2008).
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In this paper we examine the mismatch hypothesis in the context of college grad-
uation rates. As documented in Turner (2004), Bound and Turner (2007, 2011), and
Bound, Lovenheim and Turner (2010a), while the number of students attending col-
lege has increased over the past three decades in the U.S., college graduation rates
(i.e., the fraction of college enrollees that graduate) and college attainment rates
(i.e., the fraction of the population with a college degree) have hardly changed since
1970 and the time it takes college students to complete a baccalaureate (BA) degree
has increased (Bound, Lovenheim and Turner, 2010b). The disparities between the
trends in college attendance and completion or time-to-completion of college degrees
is all the more stark given that the earnings premium for a college degree relative to
a high school degree nearly doubled over this same period (Goldin and Katz, 2008).
We examine differences in graduation rates and the academic preparation of mi-
nority and non-minority students attending the various UC campuses between the
years 1995-2000, using a unique source of student-level data that covers the universe
of students who applied to one or more of the UC campuses. We obtained these data
from the University of California Office of the President, the administrative offices
of the entire UC system and refer to them as the “UCOP” data. The UCOP data
cover a period where race-based preferences were banned in California. In 1996, the
voters of California approved Proposition 209 – Prop 209 hereafter – which stipulates
that: “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in
the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.” The
Proposition took effect in 1998.
Using these student-level data, we find evidence that the graduation rates of
minorities increased after Prop 209 was implemented. Indeed, the data reveal that
under-represented minorities were 4.4 percentage points more likely to graduate in
the period after Prop 209 that the period before. We also find that the distribution
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of minorities entering the UC system shifted from its more selective campuses (e.g.,
UC Berkeley and UCLA) towards its less selective ones. Moreover, while there was
an overall improvement in the academic preparation of minorities enrolling at UC
campuses after Prop 209 went into effect, the greatest improvements occurred at the
less-selective campuses. Taken together, this evidence may be consistent with the
mismatch hypothesis noted above.
As we argue below, the scope for the mismatch of students to campuses with
affirmative action and its alleviation with bans on its use hinges on whether some
campuses, presumably less-selective ones, are better-suited to produce positive out-
comes, e.g., graduation rates, for less-prepared students while other universities, typ-
ically more-selective ones, are better-suited for more-prepared students. In contrast,
if more-selective universities were able to produce better outcomes, such as gradua-
tion rates, for students of all levels of preparation than less-selective ones, then there
is no scope for student-university mismatch. Bans on affirmative action would not be
expected to improve the graduation rates of minority students, especially those with
weaker backgrounds. We formalize these arguments below, characterizing and esti-
mating graduation production functions for each of the UC campuses and examining
whether and how they differ across campuses.
The student-level UCOP data we examine also reveal that after Prop 209 there
was a decline in the number of under-represented minorities enrolled at one of the UC
campus. And, if the minority students who did not attend a UC campus after Prop
209 were the least prepared, then graduation rates would have likely risen, regardless
of the campus they would have attended. That is, Prop 209 may have induced a
significant selection effect on minority enrollments within the UC system that would
provide an alternative explanation to mismatch for why minority graduation rates
improved.
To separate the mismatch from the enrollment selection explanations post-Prop
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209 minority graduation rate increases, we exploit the richness of the UCOP data on
cohorts of students that entered the UC system before and after Prop 209. These data
contain measures of high school GPAs and SAT scores and of parental income and
education, which allow us to both control for these factors in evaluating the effects
of Prop 209 and assess how they influence minority (and non-minority) graduation
probabilities at the various UC campuses. The UCOP data provide information not
only on which UC campus a student enrolled (as well as whether they graduated from
that campus), but also on the other UC campuses to which they applied and the
ones to which they were admitted. We use the information on the UC campuses to
which students were admitted, and the quality of those UC campuses, to implement
a modified version of the method used in Dale and Krueger (2002) to control for
student qualifications beyond those measured by high school GPA and test scores.
We decompose the post-Prop 209 change in minority graduation rates into three
components: better matching, better students, and a third, residual, category of
post-Prop 209 change in graduation rates not accounted for by the matching or
selection. We refer to the latter (residual) component as the university response to
the Prop 209 affirmative action ban.
We find that better matching can explain only 20% of the improvement in minor-
ity graduation rates within the UC system. However, this small overall effect, masks
two notable phenomena with respect to the potential role of matching. First, we
find that matching is much more important in accounting for the graduation gains of
students in the bottom of the academic preparedness distribution; moreover, it would
have been even larger had minorities been allocated to universities in the same way
whites were allocated conditional on academic preparation. Second, as we discuss in
the Conclusion, Arcidiacono, Aucejo and Hotz (2012) find that improved matching
played a much more prominent role in improved graduation rates of minorities who
initially enrolled at UC campuses in STEM (Science, Technology and Engineering)
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majors, especially in the higher rates that minorities who started in STEM majors
actually graduated with a STEM degree.
We find that the largest share of the increase in minority graduation rates, 35-
50%, is due to the changes in student characteristics with Prop 209. But the changes
in the characteristics of minority enrollees post-209 are not all in the same direction.
While some measures of preparation were higher in the post Prop 209 period (high
school grades and SAT scores) other measures actually fell (parental income and
parental education). Hence, the pool of minority enrollees actually became more
diverse from a socioeconomic perspective.3
Finally, we attribute the remaining 30-45% of the minority graduation gains to the
residual category of university response. Below, we present some anecdotal evidence
that suggest that universities did indeed respond to Prop 209 by focusing more
resources on the retention of their enrolled students, increasing their graduation
rates. That such a large share of the gains in graduation result from responses to
UC campuses suggests that potential negative effects on minorities from the removal
of affirmative action may be over-stated in one important respect: universities may
respond to decreased diversity by investing more in the minorities and other students
from disadvantaged backgrounds who do enroll.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe
the UCOP data and present the unadjusted levels and post-Prop 209 changes in
minority and white student enrollments, measures of their academic preparation and
their graduation rates. In Section 3.3 we characterize the mismatch hypothesis for
the assignment of minority students to colleges of differeing quality and establish the
conditions it requires in terms of the differences across colleges in their capacity to
produce graduation for students of disparate academic preparation. In Section 3.4
3 This may be a result of the UC system placing more weight on characteristics correlated with
race after Prop 209 since they could not explicitly take race into account. See Antonovics, Backes,
and Ramey (2012) for a discussion.
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we develop and estimate a model of college graduation that embed campus-specific
graduation production functions that depend on student preparation and allow for
a post-Prop 209 effect. In Section 5 we present the results. Given the estimates of
the model, Section 3.6 examines the extent to which Prop 209 increased graduation
rates through better matching of students to schools. Section 3.7 decomposes the
increased graduation rates following Prop 209, focusing in particular on the roles of
better matching, university responses to Proposition 209, and changes in the selection
of students who enrolled in the UC system. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Graduation Patterns in the UC System Before and After Prop
209
The data we use were obtained from the University of California Office of the
President (UCOP) under a California Public Records Act request. These data con-
tain information on applicants, enrollees and graduates of the UC system. Due to
confidentiality concerns, some individual-level information was suppressed. In par-
ticular, the UCOP data we were provided have the following limitations:4
1. The data are aggregated into three year intervals from 1992-2006.
2. The data provide no information on gender, and race is aggregated into four
categories: white, Asian, minority, and other
3. Academic data, such as SAT scores and high school grade point average (GPA),
were only provided as categorical variables, rather than the actual scores and
GPAs.
Weighed against these limitations is having access to two important pieces of infor-
mation about the individuals who applied to and possibly enrolled at a UC campus.
4 See Antonovics and Sander (2011) for a more detailed discussion of this data set.
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First, we have information on every individual who applied to any of the schools
in the UC system over the period, including to which campuses they applied and
were admitted. As described below, we use the latter information to adapt a strat-
egy used in Dale and Krueger (2002) in order to account for unmeasured student
qualifications. Second, we were provided with access to an index of each student’s
preparation for college, given by the sum of a student’s SAT I score, rescaled to be
between 0 to 600, and his or her high school GPA, rescaled to be between 0 to 400.
Below, we refer to this as a student’s high school Academic Index. We have data
for the entering cohorts in the three years prior to the implementation of Prop 209
(1995, 1996, 1997), and for three years after its passage (1998, 1999, 2000).
In Table 3.1, we present summary statistics for the individual-level UCOP data
and its measures of student qualifications by race and for applicants, admits, enrollees
and graduates for campuses in the UC system, pre- and post-Prop 209.5 The first
panel gives the descriptive statistics for under-represented minorities (URMs). As a
fraction of the number of minority graduates from California’s public high schools,6
enrollment rates fell from 4.6% to 3.6%. Conditional on enrolling, minority gradu-
ation rates increased by 4.4% off a base rate of 62.4% post-Prop 209.7 While the
share of white high school graduates who applied, attended, and graduated in the
UC system all did not significantly change post-Prop 209 (second panel), graduation
5 The corresponding data for Asian American and Other Races (including un-reported) are given
in Table B.1 in the appendix.
6 The number of California public high school graduates by race and year is given at
http://www.cpec.ca.gov/StudentData/StudentSnapshot.ASP?DataReport=KGrads. The number
of California applicants by race and year can be found at http://statfinder.ucop.edu. While not all
of the minorities applying to, enrolling at or graduating from UC campuses are from California’s
public high schools, a large fraction are and we use this benchmark to account for the trends in the
numbers of minorities at risk to go to college.
7 Graduation rates are measured as graduating in 5 years or less. There are a small number of
individuals that are listed as graduating but do not have a graduation time. In the period we
analyze, these individuals are almost exclusively listed as having a major classified as ‘Other’. We
drop these individuals from our sample though are qualitative are unaffected by the treatment of
these individuals.
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rates conditional on enrolling also showed a significant increase at 2.5%.
With respect to applications at UC campuses before and after Prop 209, while
applications by URMs increased, as a share of California public high school grad-
uates, they declined 1.1%. The latter decline suggests the possibility of a chilling
effect of Prop 209, where minorities are less likely to apply under the new admis-
sions rules. However, other evidence suggests otherwise. For example, using the
same UCOP data as used in this paper, Antonovics and Sander (2012) argue that
affirmative resulted in a warming, rather than a chilling, effect, in that minorities, as
a group, were more likely to enroll in the UC school conditional on being admitted
and Antonovics and Backes (2012) show that the sending of SAT scores by minority
applicants to UC campuses did not change post-Prop 209.
With respect to academic preparation as measured by the student’s academic in-
dex, minorities had much lower scores at each stage of the college process than whites
both prior to and after Prop 209 was implemented (Table 3.1). This difference in
academic preparation accounts, in part, for the lower proportion of minority high
school students being admitted to a UC campus (“Share of Calif. HS Grads”) com-
pared to whites. However, after Prop 209 is implemented, the academic preparation
of minority applicants, admits, enrollees, and graduates improved, both absolutely
and relative to whites. This improvement in academic preparation of the minor-
ity students that enrolled at a UC campus after Prop 209 suggests that changes in
minority student selectivity with respect to academic preparation noted in the Intro-
duction may have accounted for some, if not all, of the improved graduation rates of
minorities after the implementation of Prop 209.
But, the change in the selectivity of enrolled minority students with Prop 209
may not have improved uniformly. As shown in Table 3.1, there was a significant
and sizable decline in the proportion of minority enrollees and graduates from more
“advantaged” family backgrounds after Prop 209 went into effect. Among admitted
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minorities who actually enrolled at a UC campus, there was an 0.039 reduction (a
10% decline) in the proportion with parents who had a BA degree and a correspond-
ing 0.046 reduction (an 11% decline) among those minorities that graduated from
a UC campus after Prop 209 was implemented. Similarly, post-Prop 209 a greater
share of applicants and admits had parents with incomes above $80,000. Yet, the
share of enrollees whose parental income was greater that $80,000 fell. That is,
while minorities from more advantaged family backgrounds continued to apply and
be admitted to UC campuses after Prop 209 (though the set of UC campuses where
they were admitted may have changed), they were less likely to enroll at one of the
campuses and less likely to graduate from one of them.8 This decline in minority stu-
dents from more advantaged backgrounds that enrolled at UC campuses after Prop
209 would seem to work against improved graduation rates, given previous findings
that students from wealthier and better educated parents do better in college.9
We next consider how graduation rates and academic preparation varied across
UC campuses before and after Prop 209. Table 3.2 gives the distribution of both for
minorities and whites, respectively. The campuses are listed in order of their U.S.
News & World Report ranking as of the fall of 1997.10 We use this ranking throughout
our study as our measure of the selectivity and/or quality of the UC campuses.
Focusing initially on the pre-Prop 209 tabulations, one sees that the academic index
8 We are unable to determine whether, after Prop 209, these more advantaged minorities who
applied and were accepted to a UC campus went to colleges not subject to Prop 209, i.e., private
colleges in California or public or private colleges outside of the state. But we doubt that they
disproportionately ended up at less-selective public colleges in the state, i.e., at CSU campuses or
one of California’s community colleges, or not attending college.
9 For example, Turner (2005) finds that students of mothers with a college degree have a 14
percentage point higher probability of attaining a BA degree than do students whose mothers do
not.
10 The 1997 U.S. News & World Report rankings of National Universities are based on 1996-97
data, the academic year before Prop 209 went into effect. The rankings of the various campuses
were: UC Berkeley (27); UCLA (31); UC San Diego (34); UC Irvine (37); UC Davis (40); UC Santa
Barbara (47); UC Santa Cruz (NR); and UC Riverside (NR).
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and graduation rates are systematically related to the rankings of UC campuses, with
more-selective campuses having students that are better prepared and more likely
to graduate. This is true for minorities and for whites. And, consistent with the
tabulations in Table 3.1, whites have higher academic indices and graduation rates
than do minorities, a pattern that holds campus-by-campus.
The changes in student preparedness and graduation rates post-Prop 209 are not
ordered according to the selectivity of the various campuses (Table 3.2). For example,
UC Santa Barbara had the largest post-Prop 209 improvements in student academic
preparedness and graduation rates, even though it ranked sixth out of the eight UC
campuses in the U.S. News & World Report rankings. Furthermore, UC Berkeley
and UC Riverside, which were the top and bottom ranked UC campuses, were both
in the bottom third of post-Prop 209 gains in minority academic preparedness and
graduation rates.
Taken together, the across-campus changes that occur in minority graduation
rates and the academic preparation of those minorities that do enroll is potentially
consistent with the view that the Prop 209 ban of affirmative action resulted in minor-
ity students being better matched to campuses based on their academic preparation.
But as noted earlier, this improvement also may be consistent with greater selectivity
in UC minority enrollments post-Prop 209. In order to sort of these factors, we pro-
vide, in the next section, a more precise characterization of the conditions required
for better matching when affirmative action in the admission process is banned and,
in the following section, a strategy for isolating these matching and post-Prop 209
effects from selectivity in enrollments.
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3.3 The Mismatch Hypothesis and University Graduation Production
Functions
In this section, we characterize the mismatch hypothesis as it applies to minority
graduation rates. To fix ideas, consider the following characterization of the grad-
uation production function for one of the UC campuses. Let P gj pAIq denote the
graduation rate that campus j can produce for a minority student with an academic
preparation index of AI. For simplicity, assume that this production function is
linear and increasing in AI, i.e.,
P gj pAIq  φ0j   φ1jAI (3.1)
for UC campus j, j  1, ..., J , where φ1j ¡ 0.
One could proceed by specifying the admission criteria of campuses in the pres-
ence and absence of affirmative action, characterizing the criteria students have for
the campuses to which they apply and to which they enroll if admitted and that cam-
puses use in its admission decisions and, thus, the matching of students to colleges
(or alternative activities).11 For the purposes of assessing the mismatch hypothesis,
it is sufficient to assume that relative to an affirmative action regime, a college un-
der an affirmative action ban will place less (or no) weight on the diversity of an
incoming student body and more weight on selecting students based on their aca-
demic preparation or AI. The mismatch hypothesis asserts that, under affirmative
action, minority students are more likely to be matched to higher quality colleges for
which they are less well-prepared than their non-minority counterparts. By banning
affirmative action, this form of mismatch of minority students will be reduced, i.e.,
minority students will be “better matched” to colleges on the basis of their academic
preparation (AI), and the outcomes of minorities, such as their graduation rates,
11 See Epple, Romano and Sieg (2008) for such an equilibrium model of college admissions under
affirmative action and when it is banned.
83
will improve.12
The validity of this mismatch explanation hinges on whether colleges differ in their
graduation production functions and how they differ between high-quality (more se-
lective) and lower quality (less selective) colleges. To see this, consider Figure 1,
which illustrates two possibilities for the relationship between the production func-
tions of a more-selective college, Campus A, and a less-selective one, Campus B.
Panel (a) illustrates the case where Campus A has an absolute advantage over Cam-
pus B in producing higher graduation rates for students of all levels of academic
preparation (AI). At the same time, the way Panel (a) is drawn, the higher qual-
ity campus, A, has a comparative advantage at producing higher graduation rates
among better prepared students than Campus B. This latter assumption provides a
motivation for why better prepared students tend to attend higher quality colleges.
For the predictions of the mismatch hypothesis to hold, one requires a stronger
set of differences between the production functions of higher- and lower-quality cam-
puses. To see this, consider Panel (b) of Figure 1. As before, Campus A has a
comparative advantage in graduating better prepared students. Now, however, Cam-
pus A only has an absolute advantage in the production of graduations for better
prepared students, i.e., only for AI ¡ AI. And, Campus B now has an absolute
advantage in the production of graduations for less-prepared students (AI   AI).
Now consider what happens to a minority student with academic preparation AI1
who was admitted and attended Campus A under affirmative action but is no longer
able to get into Campus A once affirmative action is banned.13 Because it has an
absolute advantage in graduating less prepared students, this student’s likelihood
12 See Dillon and Smith (2009) for reasons why students end up over-matched or under-matched.
13 If students know their academic preparation then they would presumably internalize the fact
that their graduation rates are lower at the more selective campus. However, as discussed in
Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Fang, and Spenner (2011), when schools have private information on the
probability of success, it is possible for minority students to be made worse off under affirmative
action.
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(a) Campus A has absolute advantage in graduations
over Campus B for all levels of AI
(b) Campus A better than Campus B at graduating better
prepared students (AI ¡ AI) but B better than A for
less prepared ones (AI   AI)
Figure 1: Alternative Relationships between Graduation Production Functions of
Higher Quality and Lower Quality Campuses
of graduating from college increases by enrolling in Campus B, as the mismatch
hypothesis predicted.14
As the above discussion makes clear, the mismatch hypothesis requires lower-
quality (less selective) universities to have an absolute advantage, and not just a
comparative advantage, in graduating less academically prepared minority students.
14 Campus B having a comparative, but not absolute, advantage over A with respect to graduations
among less prepared students, as in Panel (a) of Figure 1, is not enough to generate the implications
of the mismatch hypothesis. To see this, note that if higher quality colleges have an absolute
advantage in graduating all students as in Panel (a), then a less prepared minority student with
AI1 (AI1   AI) that was admitted to Campus A under affirmative action will experience a lower,
rather than higher, graduation rate after affirmative action is banned and she can no longer attend
Campus A.
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Below, we estimate campus-specific graduation production functions for each of the
UC campuses and assess whether this condition holds across the UC system’s higher
and lower ranked campuses.
Before discussing our estimation strategy, several caveats and comments are in
order. First, our claims about what is required about the graduation production
functions of more and less selective campuses/colleges for the mismatch hypothesis
to hold does not characterize how the admission and enrollment processes of students
will change after affirmative action bans like Prop 209. As noted in Section 3.2, the
number and composition of minority student enrolled at UC campuses changed with
Prop 209. Presumably, a complete model of admission and enrollment selection
processes would be required to characterize these outcomes. In what follows, we do
not specify or estimate an explicit model, but we do develop strategies to correct for
selection effects associated with the Prop 209 ban.
Second, it is possible that affirmative action bans also may affect what colleges
do with respect to the graduation rates of minority and non-minority students. For
example, colleges subject to affirmative action bans may try to improve their tutoring
and counseling programs especially at freshman in order to help them get through
their first year of collegiate studies in order to reduce the rates of drop-out and
improve graduation rates.
There is anecdotal evidence that UC campuses did take actions after Prop 209
to improve student retention rates. For example, UCLA changed the way its in-
troductory courses for first year students were organized in the wake of Prop 209
in an attempt to improve the retention of “disadvantaged students.”15 While some
of these efforts were direct responses to the passage of Prop 209, others appear to
have been in response to the rising (and continuing) attention to retaining college
15 See “Intercollegiate Forums at UCLA discuss Retention of Minorities,” Daily Bruin, March 2,
1998.
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enrollees, especially those from disadvantaged groups.16 We note that the efforts
by UC campuses to improve outreach and retention of minority students after Prop
209 could not directly target racial and ethnic groups, which was deemed a violation
of ban on the use of race and ethnicity “in the operation of ... public education”
(Text of Proposition 209).17 This led to a restructuring of official campus programs
to target disadvantaged, rather than only minority, students based on “academic
profiles, personal backgrounds and social and environmental barriers that may affect
[a student’s] university experience, retention and graduation.”18 As a result, some
of these retention efforts in response to, or coincident with, Prop 209 may affect the
graduation rates of minority and non-minority students.
In the empirical analyses presented below we allow for post-Prop 209 changes
in graduation rates at UC campuses, net of changes in selectivity in student en-
rollments and campus-specific graduation production functions. We examine the
extent to which such changes occurred not just among minorities but also among
non-minorities. The latter effects might be expected to the extent that efforts to im-
prove retention and graduation rates were not (or could not be) targeted exclusively
to minorities. We refer to these effects as the “university response,” although it is
really a residual effect since we are not able to directly quantify or characterize the
programs that were put in place to improve retentions after the passage of the ban.
3.4 Estimating Graduation Production Functions and the Post-Prop
209 Effect on Graduations
In order to assess the role of mismatch, selection and any post-Prop 209 response
16 See “Scholars urge Early Help for Minorities,” UCLA Today, March 16, 1998.
17 See “Prop. 209 Mandates Changes on Campus,” UCLA Today, October 10, 1997. As noted
in Horn and Flores (2003), some of the post-Prop 209 efforts to improve the retention of minority
enrollees at UC Berkeley were handled by student-run organizations who were not directly subject
this provision of Prop 209.
18 “Prop. 209 Mandates Changes on Campus,” UCLA Today, October 10, 1997.
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by UC campuses to improve graduation rates, we specify and estimate models of
college graduation. In the discussion below, we focus on minority students, although
we later present estimates for corresponding models estimated for whites and Asian
Americans.
Our interest focuses on estimating the parameters of the campus-specific produc-
tion functions in (3.1) and any post-Prop 209 additional change in minority gradua-
tion rates among enrollees, net of the post-Prop 209 changes in the admissions and
enrollment processes that were manifested in the changing characteristics of minor-
ity students seen in Table 3.1. As before, the probability i in cohort t graduates
from institution j is specified as depending on the student’s academic preparation.
We now extend the model from the previous section to also allow the probability
of graduating to depend on her family background characteristics, Xit, to capture,
for example, financial constraints and preferences, and whether the individual was a
part of the post-Prop 209 cohort, POSTit, to capture factors such as the response
by universities to Prop-209. Let Gijt denote the 0/1 indicator of whether minority
student i who enrolled at UC campus j in cohort t graduated. We then specify Gijt
as:
Gijt  P
g
j pAIit, POSTit, Xitq   ζit
 φ0j   φ1jAIit   φ2POSTit   φ3Xit   ζit (3.2)
where ζit is an error term that captures unobserved (to the econometrician) student
preferences and characteristics and where φ0j and φ1j are the parameters of the
campus-specific production function in (3.1).19
Ideally, a student’s unobserved preferences and characteristics captured by ζit
would be independent from which campus they attended, whether they were enrolled
19 We maintain the linear probability model specification in (3.2) to model graduation rates
throughout.
88
in a pre- or post-Prop 209 entry cohort, their AI and their family background,
X. If so, the parameters in linear probability model in (3.2) would be consistently
estimated using standard regression methods. But some of a student’s unobserved
characteristics are likely to correlated with the quality/selectivity of the campus
they attend. As has been noted in the literature,20 failure to control for the full
set of factors will likely to result in biased estimates of the effects of attending
more-selective colleges on the outcomes of interest. To help mitigate this source of
selection bias, we implement a modified version of the selection correction method of
Dale and Krueger (2002), using information in the UCOP data on the selectivity of
the UC campuses to which students were admitted as a proxy for their unmeasured
qualifications for college.
Following Dale and Krueger (2002), we construct the following set of indicator
variables that measure the selectivity of the UC campuses to which a given student
was admitted. Using the U.S. News & World Report Top 50 University rankings for
1997, we array the UC campuses from highest ranked to lowest ranked.21 The first
indicator, ai1t is set equal to 1 for all students that were admitted at UC Berkeley
(the top ranked campus) and 0 otherwise. The second indicator, ai2t is set equal
to 1 for all students that were admitted to UC Berkeley and/or UCLA (the second
ranked school), and we proceed in this way until we define the final indicator, ai,J1,t,
which is set equal to 1 if a student was admitted to at least one of the UC campuses
ranked higher than or equal to UC Santa Cruz, the second-lowest ranked campus in
the UC system at the time in 1997. We add these these controls variables to the
20 See, for example, Black, Daniel, and Smith (2001), Dale and Krueger (2002), Black and Smith
(2004), and Hoxby (2009).
21 Recall that these rankings were (with a campus’s rank in parentheses): UC Berkeley (27); UCLA
(31); UC San Diego (34); UC Irvine (37); UC Davis (40); UC Santa Barbara (47); UC Santa Cruz
(NR); and UC Riverside (NR).
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specification in (3.2) to obtain:
Gijt  φ

0j   φ

1jAIit   φ

2POSTit   φ

3Xit  
J1¸
k1
φ4kaikt   ζ

it (3.3)
We refer to (3.3) as our Baseline Specification.
While accounting for selection on unobservables based on the application of Dale-
Krueger in (3.3) may produce unbiased estimates of the campus-specific production
function parameters, (φ0j, φ

1j), the resulting estimate of the direct effect of Prop 209
on graduation rates, φ2 , is likely to be biased for the following reason. Unlike the
case considered in Dale and Krueger (2002), the admissions processes of campuses
were required to change under Prop 209. In particular, Prop 209 required that a
person’s race or ethnicity could no longer be used as a criteria for admission at any
UC campus. As a result, the probability that a minority applicant with a given set of
credentials was admitted to a UC campus, especially highly selective ones, was likely
to have changed with the implementation of Prop 209. Based on the selectivity of
the UC campuses to which a minority was admitted measured by ait, it will appear
as though minorities pre-Prop 209 were stronger than those post-Prop 209 because
more minorities were admitted to the more-selective UC campuses based on their
race/ethnicity prior to Prop 209 than after it was implemented.
To account for the change in UC admission criteria with Prop 209, we adjust the
Dale and Krueger (2002) method in the following way. First, we run the regression in
(3.3) and retrieve the Dale and Krueger “index” of college preparedness,
°J1
k1 φˆ

4kaikt,
for each student that was accepted at a UC campus. We then regress these indices
on student’s academic index, AIit, family background characteristics, Xit, and the
dummy indicator of whether the student applied in the post-Prop 209 period:
J1¸
k1
φˆ4kaikt  θ0   θ1POSTit   θ2AIit   θ3Xit   ηit (3.4)
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It follows that our estimate of the response by universities to Prop 209 is given by:
:φ2  φˆ

2   θˆ1POSTit. (3.5)
We expect θˆ1 to be negative, as we anticipate that failure to make this adjustment
for post-Prop 209 differences in selection procedures, we would tend to overestimate
the response by universities to Prop 209. We refer to the above adjustment of the
Baseline Specification as selection adjustment Method 1.
The adjustment in (3.5) may still be biased upward because less minorities were
admitted to any UC campus after Prop 209, implying the set of admits in the
post-period would be on average stronger (beyond observables) than those in the
pre-period. To adjust for this, we throw out pre-period individuals in the bottom 7%
of the
°J1
k1 φˆ

4kaikt distribution, which roughly corresponds to the drop in minorities
admitted to any campus in the post period. We then re-estimate (3.4) and calculate
again the adjustment given in (3.5). We refer to this second adjustment of the
Baseline Specification as selection adjustment Method 2. Note that neither of these
adjustments of the coefficient on POST affects the estimates of the other coefficients.
3.5 Results
Parameter estimates for the Baseline Specification in (3.3) for under-represented
minorities (URM), whites and Asian Americans are presented in Table B.2 in the
Appendix. To focus attention on the heterogeneity across schools, we re-display the
UC campus-specific graduation production function parameters estimates for minori-
ties in Table 3.3. All coefficients are expressed relative to those for UC Riverside.
Based on these estimates, we can decisively reject that all of the UC campuses have
the same intercept for minorities (i.e., that φ0j  0 @j) or the same rates of convert-
ing the academic preparation into graduation (i.e., that φ1j  0 @j). The relative
magnitudes of φ0js and φ

1js across the UC campuses also are correlated with their
degree of selectivity. The correlation coefficient for the institution-specific slopes with
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Table 3.3: Parameters Estimates for UC
Campus-Specific Graduation Production Func-
tions for Minorities†
Academic
Campus Intercept Index§
UC Berkeley -0.405*** 0.538***
(0.086) (0.129)
UCLA -0.547*** 0.766***
(0.089) (0.133)
UC San Diego -0.291** 0.413**
(0.123) (0.178)
UC Davis -0.553*** 0.722***
(0.093) (0.144)
UC Irvine -0.198* 0.282*
(0.104) (0.162)
UC Santa Barbara -0.136 0.236*
(0.090) (0.142)
UC Santa Cruz 0.010 -0.024
(0.093) (0.149)
Data Source: UCOP. N = 23,177.
† See equation (3.1) for specification of graduation pro-
duction function. The intercepts and slope coefficients
are measured relative to those for the UC Riverside, the
lowest ranked UC campus.
*** p   0.01, ** p   0.05, * p   0.1.
the average minority academic index in the pre-period is 0.72, suggesting that more
(less) selective schools have a comparative advantage in graduating better (worse)
prepared students. In contrast, the correlation coefficient for the institution-specific
intercepts and the average minority academic index is -0.72.
To illustrate the student-campus sorting implied by the estimates in Table 3.3,
we use the parameter estimates in Table 3.3 to predict campus-specific graduation
probabilities for minority students from different parts of the academic index distri-
bution. More formally, we use the parameter estimates for the baseline estimating
equation in (3.3) to predict graduation probabilities for hypothetical student h with
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academic preparation AIs in the pre-Prop 209 period:
P gj pAIs, Xh, POSTh, φˆ
q  φˆ0j   φˆ

1jAIs   φˆ

2POSTh   φˆ

3Xh  
J1¸
k1
φˆ4kahk (3.6)
where AIs is the cutoff value for sth percentile of the minority distribution of A, and
where these probabilities were evaluated for each UC campus k  1, ..., J , for various
values of AIs. Here, we set the values of Xh to the averages for minority enrollees
in pre-Prop 209 period.22 The rankings of the UC campuses for each percentile are
based on the means of the predicted graduation rates based on (3.6) evaluated at
corresponding values of AIs.
The rankings of UC campuses by their predicted minority graduation rates are
displayed in Table 3.4. Several patterns emerge from this Table. First, the rankings
of campuses in terms of their graduation rate productivity differ across the academic
index distribution. (This is consistent with the across-campus differences in the esti-
mates of φ1js and φ3js in Table 3.3.) Second, some of the UC campuses appear to have
an absolute advantage (or disadvantage) in producing high graduation rates across
the whole distribution of student preparedness. For example, UC Santa Barbara is
predicted to produce among the highest, if not the highest, minority graduation rates
at each part of the academic index distribution, whereas, UC Davis is predicted to
the lowest, or near the lowest, graduation rates at each level of academic preparation.
At the same time, most of the rest of the campuses exhibit an absolute advantage in
minority graduations for some parts of the preparation distribution but not others.
(Recall that absolute differences among campuses in the production of graduations
for students at different parts of the preparation distribution is a necessary condi-
tion for the mismatch hypothesis.) For example, UCLA, the second-most selective
22 Note that since our estimating equation is linear, the relative rankings of the campuses will
not change if we instead considered the post-Prop 209 period or varied the values of the family
background characteristics.
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UC campus, is predicted to produce relatively low graduation rates for less-prepared
students but is one of the best campuses at producing high graduation rates among
the best-prepared minorities. In contrast, UC Santa Cruz and UC Riverside, the two
least-selective UC campuses, perform well in graduating less-prepared minorities but
not better-prepared ones.
Table 3.4 also makes clear that heterogeneity in graduation rates across universi-
ties is particularly large for those at the bottom of the distribution. The gap between
the highest and lowest graduation rates across schools for students at the 10th per-
centile of the academic index was over 16 percentage points. For students at the 75th
percentile of the academic index, the gap between the highest and lowest graduation
rates across schools was less than half that at 7.1 percentage points.
With the estimates of (3.3) and making the corresponding adjustments given by
Method 1 and Method 2, we can calculate the effect of Proposition 209 beyond that
due to selection and changes in the matching of students to schools. Table 3.5 gives
the estimates of the coefficient on POST , both under the Baseline Specification and
with the corrections outlined in Methods 1 and 2, respectively. Without adjustments,
we see that while these net effects are statistically significant for minorities and
whites, their values – 4.0% for URMs and 2.3% for whites – are not much different
from the unadjusted estimates in Table 3.1. However, when we further adjust for
the consequences that Prop 209 had on UC admissions criteria, these estimates fall.
Under Method 1 we assume that the pre-Prop 209 admits had the same distribution
of unobservables as the post-Prop 209 admits. We find that the direct effect of
enrolling in the post-Prop 209 period on graduation rates was 2 percentage points
for minorities and 1.5 percentage points for whites. Since the evidence in Table
3.1 clearly indicates that some minorities would not be admitted to any campus
post Proposition 209, Method 2 further drops the bottom 7% of minority admits in
the pre-Prop 209 period when calculating the adjustment to the POST coefficient.
94
T
ab
le
3.
4:
R
an
k
in
gs
of
U
C
S
ch
o
ol
s
b
y
P
re
d
ic
te
d
G
ra
d
u
at
io
n
R
at
es
at
V
ar
io
u
s
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
of
th
e
H
ig
h
S
ch
o
ol
A
ca
d
em
ic
In
d
ex
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
s
b
as
ed
on
M
in
or
it
y
C
o
effi
ci
en
ts
E
st
im
at
es
†
P
er
ce
n
ti
le
of
th
e
M
in
or
it
y
A
ca
d
em
ic
In
d
ex
1
0
th
2
5t
h
50
th
75
th
95
th
R
iv
er
si
d
e
(0
.6
1
3)
S
an
ta
B
ar
b
ar
a
(0
.6
31
)
S
an
ta
B
ar
b
ar
a
(0
.6
66
)
S
an
ta
B
ar
b
ar
a
(0
.7
0
2)
U
C
L
A
(0
.7
63
)
S
an
ta
C
ru
z
(0
.6
10
)
R
iv
er
si
d
e
(0
.6
31
)
R
iv
er
si
d
e
(0
.6
51
)
Ir
v
in
e
(0
.6
73
)
S
a
n
ta
B
a
rb
a
ra
(0
.7
53
)
S
an
ta
B
a
rb
a
ra
(0
.6
01
)
S
a
n
ta
C
ru
z
(0
.6
27
)
S
an
ta
C
ru
z
(0
.6
45
)
S
an
D
ie
go
(0
.6
7
2)
S
a
n
D
ie
g
o
(0
.7
39
)
Ir
v
in
e
(0
.5
63
)
Ir
v
in
e
(0
.5
9
6)
Ir
v
in
e
(0
.6
33
)
R
iv
er
si
d
e
(0
.6
72
)
Ir
v
in
e
(0
.7
2
7)
S
an
D
ie
g
o
(0
.5
3
9)
S
an
D
ie
g
o
(0
.5
79
)
S
an
D
ie
go
(0
.6
25
)
U
C
L
A
(0
.6
65
)
B
er
ke
le
y
(0
.7
23
)
B
er
ke
le
y
(0
.4
9
0
)
B
er
k
el
ey
(0
.5
36
)
U
C
L
A
(0
.5
95
)
S
an
ta
C
ru
z
(0
.6
65
)
D
av
is
(0
.7
22
)
U
C
L
A
(0
.4
68
)
U
C
L
A
(0
.5
2
7)
B
er
ke
le
y
(0
.5
90
)
B
er
ke
le
y
(0
.6
4
6)
R
iv
er
si
d
e
(0
.7
0
1)
D
av
is
(0
.4
39
)
D
av
is
(0
.4
95
)
D
av
is
(0
.5
60
)
D
av
is
(0
.6
28
)
S
an
ta
C
ru
z
(0
.6
9
2)
D
at
a
S
ou
rc
e:
U
C
O
P
.
†
A
ve
ra
ge
p
re
d
ic
te
d
gr
ad
u
at
io
n
p
ro
b
ab
il
it
ie
s
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
T
h
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
p
ro
b
a
b
il
it
ie
s
w
er
e
fo
rm
ed
u
si
n
g
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
sp
ec
ifi
ca
ti
on
(3
.6
)
fo
r
m
in
or
it
ie
s
an
d
w
er
e
p
re
d
ic
te
d
u
si
n
g
th
e
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
o
f
m
in
o
ri
ty
st
u
d
en
ts
th
a
t
en
ro
ll
ed
a
t
o
n
e
o
f
th
e
U
C
ca
m
p
u
se
s
in
th
e
ye
ar
s
19
95
-1
99
8.
95
Table 3.5: Adjusted Post-Proposition 209 Ef-
fects
Standard
Coeff Error
Unadjusted
Minority 0.040*** (0.006)
White 0.023*** (0.004)
Asian 0.032*** (0.004)
Adjusted
Minority (Method 1) 0.020*** (0.006)
Minority (Method 2) 0.013* (0.007)
White 0.015*** (0.004)
Asian 0.024*** (0.004)
Data Source: UCOP.
*** p   0.01, ** p   0.05, * p   0.1.
Under Method 2, the effect falls to 1.3 percentage points for minorities, which is
still substantial. Complementing the anecdotal evidence given in Section 3.3, these
results are consistent with campuses within the UC system responding to Prop 209
by providing more resources to help retain and facilitate higher graduation rates of
those students who did enroll after the ban went into effect. As we noted in Section
3.3, the campuses did undertake such efforts and our findings are suggestive that
they had a positive effect on minority, and non-minority, graduation rates.
3.6 Did Re-Allocating Students across Campuses Improve Minority
Graduation Rates?
As documented in the preceding section, UC campuses differed in their “produc-
tivity” of graduating students from differing academic backgrounds. Moreover, it
appears that less-selective campuses had either an absolute advantage in producing
higher graduation rates for all students or for less prepared students, with the lat-
ter being a necessary condition for mismatch. So, to what extent were these Prop
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209 gains in minority graduation rates the result of better student-campus matching
based on academic preparation that many proponents of banning the use of affir-
mative action in college admissions claim will result from such bans? And, more
generally, to what extent can re-allocating students across campuses improve minor-
ity graduation rates?
3.6.1 Alternative Assignment Rules
In this section we attempt to provide partial answers to these questions. We
do so by examining the consequences for minority graduation rates from using sev-
eral “rules” for allocating, or assigning, students across the UC campuses. The as-
signment rules we consider either capture how minorities (and non-minorities) were
allocated across the UC campuses under Prop 209 or provide a quantitative bench-
mark for how much student-campus matching on academic preparation could have
changed minority graduation rates. To avoid confounding the effect of re-allocating
students across campuses with those from changes in the composition of minority
enrollees that occurred with Prop 209, we use the same “population” of minority
students, namely those who enrolled at a UC campus prior to Prop 209, calculating
the campus assignments and implied graduation rates under each rule.
We consider the following three rules for assigning minority students across the
UC campuses:
AR1: Assign students to the campus that maximizes their probability of graduating
AR2: Assign students to campuses following (implicit) rule used to assign minorities
post-Prop 209
AR3: Assign students to campuses following (implicit) rule used to assign whites
post-Prop 209
The first assignment rule (AR1) focuses exclusively on achieving high graduation
rates, providing the benchmark for the potential impact of student-campus match-
ing on academic preparation. To operationalize AR1, we use the predicted grad-
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uation probabilities for minority student h given in (3.6) to assign her to that
UC campus that yields the highest probability that she will graduate. Let that
school be denoted by jmax, and the graduation probability associated with it is
P gjmaxpAIs, Xh, POSTh, φˆ
q . As noted above, we evaluate these graduation proba-
bilities for the sample of pre-Prop 209 (POST  0) minority UC enrollees.
The second assignment rule, AR2, characterizes how minorities were allocated
across the UC campuses after Prop 209 went into effect. We also investigate a third
assignment rule (AR3) that characterizes what would have happened to minority
graduation rates if minority students had been allocated across the UC campuses
as whites were after Prop 209. While Prop 209 stipulated that California’s public
universities could not use race or ethnicity as a criteria for admission, this does not
imply that the post-Prop 209 across-campus assignment rules for the enrollment of
minorities and whites will necessarily be the same. Minorities and whites may have
differed in their preferences for attending a particular campus and/or differed in
their in-state private and out-of-state college alternatives. Furthermore, in contrast
to AR1, neither AR2 or AR3 is insured, by design, to improve the graduation rates
of enrolled students. Comparing the results for AR2 and AR3 helps one assess the
importance these other factors might play in minority graduation rates.
To operationalize AR2 and AR3, we estimated a multinomial logit model of the
UC campus that students actually attended for each of two samples: post-Prop 209
minority UC enrollees for AR2 and post-Prop 209 white UC enrollees for AR3. The
probability of choosing a given campus is a function of the same measures of student
academic preparedness, AI, and family background, X, used in the estimation of
the campus-specific graduation model presented above. Let pˆiARn, n  2, 3, denote
the estimated parameter vectors for the UC campus enrollment models for the sam-
ples corresponding to assignment rules AR2 and AR3, respectively. The predicted
probability of being assigned to UC campus j under assignment rule ARn is given
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by:
P aj pAIh, Xh, pˆi
ARnq 
exppAIhpˆi
ARn
1j  Xhpˆi
ARn
2j q°J
k1 exppAIhpˆi
ARn
1k  Xhpˆi
ARn
2k q
(3.7)
for n  2, 3. As with the graduation probabilities evaluated under AR1, we evaluate
these assignment probabilities at the characteristics of the pre-Prop 209 UC minority
enrollees. Finally, the graduation probabilities associated with these two assignment
rules are weighted averages of the predicted graduation probabilities for the UC
campuses, using the rule-specific assignment probabilities in (3.7) as weights, i.e.:
P gARnpAIh, Xh, POSTh, φˆ, pˆi
ARnq 
J¸
k1
P gk pAIh, Xh, Γˆh, POSTh, φˆqP
a
k pAIh, Xh, pˆi
ARnq(3.8)
for n  2, 3.
3.6.2 Graduation predictions from alternative assignment rules
The estimated minority graduation rates for the three assignment rules are recorded
at the top of Table 3.6, along with the actual graduation rates for the pre-Prop 209
minority UC enrollees. As noted above, we used the characteristics of the latter
group of minorities to generate the predictions associated with each of the assign-
ment rules to facilitate comparisons. For both the observed rates and those predicted
under each of the three assignment rules, we display the (overall) mean graduation
rate and those for the deciles of the minority academic index distribution. To better
gauge the predicted changes in graduation rates relative to the pre-Prop 209 ones,
we present, in rows (A), (B) and (C) of Table 3.6, the differences between the pre-
dicted graduation rates and the pre-Prop 209 observed rates. Below the labeled rows
in this table, we express these differences as a percentage of the observed minority
graduation rates and, where appropriate, as a percent of the difference between the
predicted rates for AR1 and the actual ones.
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The average maximum possible improvement in minority graduation rates through
matching under AR1 is 4.7 percentage points, which is a 7.5% improvement over
pre-Prop 209 minority graduation rates. This average masks more sizeable predicted
gains across the distribution of minority academic preparedness. In particular, mi-
norities in the bottom half of the academic index distribution would experience an
improvement in graduation rates of almost 10% if students were re-allocated accord-
ing to AR1. At the same time, the sizes of these gains suggest there are limits to
what can be achieved via better matching, an issue to which we return below.
In row (B) of Table 3.6 we display the changes in minority graduation rates that
would have occurred if the pre-Prop 209 cohorts of UC enrollees would have sorted
themselves across the UC campuses in the manner that minorities did after Prop 209
(AR2). Note that this is a counterfactual evaluation, since we know that the char-
acteristics of the minorities that enrolled within the UC system after Prop 209 did
change [Table 3.1]. We find an average improvement of 0.9 percentage point increase
in minority graduation rates, a 1.4% improvement over pre-Prop 209 rates. The
magnitudes of the gains in minority graduation rates from the re-allocation under
AR2 are modest, but higher for the bottom half of the academic preparation distri-
bution, where minority graduation rates would improve by 2.8% (a 1.5 percentage
point increase) for those in the second decile. The AR2 allocation achieves 19.3% of
the maximum attainable gains associated with AR1 [row (A)]. It achieves more of
the maximum possible gains for the bottom part of the preparedness distribution,
accounting for up to 27.4% of the possible gains.
Finally, we examine what would have happened to minority graduation rates
after Prop 209 was implemented if minorities had been assigned to UC campuses in
the same way that whites were. In row (C) of Table 3.6 we present the graduation
rates associated with this counterfactual change in assignment rules (AR3). On
average, minorities would have done better under AR3 than under AR2, although
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the difference in the average graduation rates is only 0.3 percentage points. Under the
white post-Prop 209 assignment rules, minorities would have attained over 26% of the
maximum possible gain from re-allocation of students across campuses. Moreover,
under the white assignment rules, the gains in graduation rates would have been
especially large for those at the bottom of the distribution, achieving up to 39.3% of
the maximum possible gains.
3.6.3 Alternative assignment rules and school-specific minority representation
We now turn to how these alternative assignment rules would affect the distribu-
tion of minority students across universities. First, we consider what the re-allocation
of minority students across the UC campuses under AR1 would look like and how
big a change it would be relative to the pre-Prop 209 distribution. In Table 3.7 we
present tabulations of the shares of minorities that would be assigned to each of the
eight UC campuses under the three assignment rules, as well as the actual shares of
minorities that enrolled at these campuses prior to Prop 209. Prior to Prop 209 mi-
norities were disproportionately enrolled at the more-selective UC campuses. Almost
one-half of minorities were at the three most selective campuses, UC Berkeley, UCLA
and UC San Diego, with UC Berkeley and UCLA having the two largest shares. At
the same time, UC Santa Barbara had a sizable share (14.3%) of the minorities en-
rolled in the UC system prior to Prop 209. Under AR1, the allocation of minorities
would change dramatically [columns under (A)]. In particular, almost 70% of them
would be enrolled at UC Santa Barbara, with the remaining 23.8%, 7.8%, and 0.6%
enrolling at UC Riverside, UCLA, and UC Santa Cruz respectively. No minorities
would enroll at any of the other campuses. Recall that UC Santa Barbara appeared
to have an absolute advantage in converting minority enrollments into graduations
for most students.
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A look at the two columns under (B) of Table 3.7 shows how AR2 re-allocated stu-
dents across the UC campuses. While obviously less dramatic than the re-allocation
associated with AR1, we predict that the pre-Prop 209 UC enrollees would have
been reallocated from the three most-selective UC campuses (UC Berkeley, UCLA
and UC San Diego) to the less-selective ones (UC Riverside and UC Santa Cruz). In
contrast to the re-allocation under AR1, only a modest share of the minorities would
be re-allocated to UC Santa Barbara under AR2, the UC campus that we found had
an absolute advantage for graduating most minority students.
Comparing the AR3 re-allocation in the columns under (C) of Table 3.7 with
those for AR2 in the columns under (B), we see that the post-Prop 209 assignment
rule for whites even more dramatically moved students out of the most-selective cam-
puses than did AR2 and, importantly, re-allocated many more of them to UC Santa
Barbara, the most productive campus for producing graduation rates for students of
most levels of academic preparation.23
3.7 Decomposing the Effects of Proposition 209 on Minority Gradu-
ation Rates
Having examined the role matching played in the higher graduation rates post-
Prop 209, we summarize our findings by decomposing the effects Prop 209 had on
graduation into three parts. First, as discussed in the previous section, is the effects
on matching. Second, is the effect that we term “university response,” the estimated
effect of enrolling in the post-Prop 209 period beyond the due to matching and
selection. Finally, is the part due to Prop 209 resulting in a better set of minority
student attending college.
Table 3.8 breaks out the various mechanisms behind the increased graduation
23 As we noted earlier, Prop 209 does not require that minority and non-minorities have the same
enrollment rules. Our analysis does not imply that any of the UC campuses circumvented Prop
209 in their admissions procedures. For example, it is possible that there are racial and ethnic
differences in geographical preferences for colleges or in information about graduation probabilities.
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Table 3.8: Decomposing the Effect of Proposition 209 on Graduation†
Method 1 Method 2
Level Share of Total Level Share of Total
Total increase = 4.4%
(a) Improved Matching 0.9% 20.5% 0.9% 20.5%
(b) University Response 2.0% 45.5% 1.3% 29.5%
(c) Selection 1.5% 34.0% 2.2% 50.0%
† Selection effect calculated as Total Increase  (a)  (b).
rates post-Prop 209. Recall from Table 3.1 that the overall graduation rate in-
creased by 4.4 percentage points for minority enrollees. Of this increase, 20.5% can
be explained by better matching of students to the UC campuses based on the stu-
dents’ preparation and campus graduation production functions. Recall that the
university response is measured by :φ2 , the coefficient on POST in equation (3.5).
We estimated this effect under two scenarios (Methods 1 and 2) that are likely to
bound the true effect. The first, Method 1, assumes that the distribution of unob-
servables for enrollees in the same in the pre- and post-Prop 209 periods, while the
second, Method 2, removed pre-Prop 209 minority enrollees with the lowest levels of
academic preparation to be more comparable with the better prepared post-Prop 209
minority enrollees. Our estimates imply that this university response accounts for
between 29.5% and 45.5% of the graduation rate increase, depending on the Method
used. It follows that the remainder of the increase in graduation rates is due to
changes the selectivity in the academic preparation and backgrounds of minorities
that enrolled after Prop 209. We find that this change in selectivity accounts for
between 34% and 50% of the graduation rate increase.
3.8 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined how the match between the student and the
school affects college graduation rates. We have found evidence that less-selective UC
schools tend to be better at graduating less-prepared students, with more selective
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schools better at graduating more-prepared students. These results are relevant to
the debate over the merits of affirmative action in university admissions to the extent
that affirmative action leads to inefficient sorting.
Using data before and after an affirmative action ban, we found evidence that
Prop 209 did lead to a more efficient sorting of minority students within the UC
system. However, the effects were relatively small and we can say little about what
happened to those that did not attend a UC school as a result of Prop 209.24 Given
large differences in academic preparation due to differences in the family backgrounds
of students and the quality of the primary and secondary schools they attended, there
is little scope for dramatic shifts in graduation outcomes by re-sorting of students
across campuses.25 That being said, our results indicate that better matching of stu-
dents to campuses based on academic preparation does produce the largest gradua-
tion rate gains for those students in the bottom part of the distribution of academic
preparation. Further, while matching effects are small when comparing five-year
graduation rates, a companion paper (Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz, 2012) shows
that mismatch effects are much larger when looking at persistence in STEM fields
and in time to graduation.
Possibly our most intriguing finding is that the imposition of an affirmative action
ban may have induced a response by universities in their efforts to keep students from
dropping out and completing their studies. Previous studies of affirmative action have
ignored the potential for such an institutional response targeted at those minorities
that do enroll after a ban and our results suggest that the magnitude of the potential
detrimental effects of affirmative action bans may be overstated by not taking these
24 While estimates suggest selective schools see a drop in minority enrollment following affirma-
tive action bans (Long 2004 and Hinrichs 2012), overall college enrollment rates remain relatively
unaffected following a ban (Backes 2012 and Hinrichs 2012).
25 These results are consistent with Arcidiacono and Koedel (2012) who find that most of the
black/white differences in college graduation rates stem from differences in student academic prepa-
ration.
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responses into account.
More generally, finding ways to improve the college graduation rates of minorities
– regardless of the motivation – would appear to be of growing importance, given the
evidence that attending but not graduating from college has sizeable consequences in
one’s later life. Consider, for example, the disparity in labor market earnings between
those who attend but do not graduate from college and those that do graduate. Based
on data from the 2008-2010 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS), we
estimate that the annual earnings of African American men who completed their
BA degree is 47.1% higher than for those who attended but did not graduate from
college. The corresponding differentials are even larger for African American women
(51.1%) and sizeable for both Hispanic men (36.1%) and women (41.1%).26
26 By way of comparison, the corresponding differentials are 46.5% for white men and 43.0% for
white women.
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Appendix A
State-Level Descriptive Tables
Table A.1: Whether Individual Lives in Home State
Age Range  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
18-23 93.9% 92.7% 91.9% 91.4% 92.3%
24-29 93.7% 87.5% 83.4% 70.4% 82.5%
30-35 90.1% 90.0% 81.9% 58.6% 78.6%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
Table A.2: Annual Interstate Move Rates
Age Range  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
18-23 3.1% 3.9% 4.1% 5.2% 4.1%
24-29 3.9% 4.0% 5.1% 9.8% 5.9%
30-35 2.1% 3.1% 2.8% 7.2% 4.2%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
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Table A.3: Interstate Moves by Age 30
Proportion of Individuals Moving Between 18-30
  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
% Moved 15.8% 19.2% 22.3% 37.1% 25.2%
Number of Moves (If Any Moves by 30)
  HS Grad HS Grad Some Coll Coll Grad Overall
One 57.9% 31.0% 36.8% 36.3% 36.3%
Two 26.3% 42.5% 47.4% 29.3% 36.6%
Three or More 15.8% 26.4% 15.8% 34.4% 27.1%
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
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Table A.4: Wage Regression Coefficients, State Level
Wage Regression Coefficients: Dependent Var Ln(Wage)
HS Grad Coll Grad
Model 1 (3.4):
Father’s State 0.0128 -0.1746 ***
Model 2 (3.5):
Father’s State -0.0233 -0.1936 ***
Cognitive 0.2188 *** 0.6411 ***
Motor 0.0659 0.0058
Model 3 (3.6):
Father’s State -0.0035 -0.1533 ***
Cognitive 0.1927 *** 0.6288 ***
Motor 0.0276 0.0013
Father’s Cog 0.1895 *** 0.153 **
Father’s Mot 0.008 0.0626
Model 4 (3.6):
Father’s State 0.1607 -0.6643 ***
Cognitive 0.1885 *** 0.6056 ***
Motor 0.0285 -0.001
Father’s Cog x Diff Loc 0.1543 -0.1457
Father’s Cog x Same Loc 0.1917 *** 0.3693 ***
Father’s Mot x Diff Loc 0.2709 ** -0.1297
Father’s Mot x Same Loc -0.0382 0.1777 ***
Model 5 (3.6):
Father’s State 0.2153 * -0.8738 ***
Cognitive 0.1873 *** 0.6213 ***
Motor 0.0324 0.0376
Father’s Cog x Diff Loc 0.1289 -0.2673 **
Father’s Cog x Same Loc 0.1921 *** 0.3798 ***
Father’s Mot x Diff Loc 0.2501 * -0.1212
Father’s Mot x Same Loc -0.0412 0.1715 **
Occ. Distance x Diff Loc 0.1758 -0.2888 ***
Occ. Distance x Same Loc -0.0071 0.042
“Same/Diff as Father” Location are at the level of US State
*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% levels
Data Source: Author’s Calculations, PSID.
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Appendix B
UCOP Individual Summary Statistics and Baseline
Model Estimates
111
B
.1
A
p
p
en
d
ix
T
ab
le
B
.1
:
C
h
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
of
U
C
A
p
p
li
ca
n
ts
,
A
d
m
it
s,
an
d
E
n
ro
ll
ee
s
P
re
-P
ro
p
20
9
an
d
P
os
t-
P
ro
p
20
9
C
h
an
ge
,
A
si
an
A
m
er
i-
ca
n
s
an
d
O
th
er
s†
A
p
p
li
ed
A
d
m
it
te
d
E
n
ro
ll
ed
G
ra
d
u
at
ed
P
re
-
P
re
-
P
re
-
P
re
-
P
ro
p
20
9
C
h
an
ge
P
ro
p
20
9
C
h
an
ge
P
ro
p
20
9
C
h
an
ge
P
ro
p
20
9
C
h
an
ge
A
si
an
s:
N
o.
of
A
si
an
s
53
,7
39
9,
62
9
42
,5
56
6,
41
2
26
,1
30
4,
31
6
19
,3
37
4,
26
5
H
ig
h
S
ch
o
ol
A
ca
d
.
In
d
ex
70
1.
9
8.
2


72
3.
7
5.
4


71
7.
2
9.
8


72
9.
6
8.
3


P
ar
en
ts
h
av
e
B
A
0.
65
2
0.
00
4
0.
65
9
-0
.0
07


0.
63
6
-0
.0
02
0.
65
6
-0
.0
08

P
ar
en
ts
’
In
co
m
e
¤
$3
0K
0.
29
3
-0
.0
26



0.
30
1
-0
.0
22



0.
32
2
-0
.0
28



0.
30
1
-0
.0
27



P
ar
en
ts
’
In
co
m
e
¥
$8
0K
0.
29
1
0.
05
3


0.
28
8
0.
04
6


0.
26
6
0.
05
2


0.
28
0
0.
05
4


G
ra
d
u
at
io
n
R
at
e
0.
74
9
0.
03
7


O
th
er
s,
in
cl
u
di
n
g
U
n
kn
ow
n
s:
N
o.
of
O
th
er
s
10
,1
43
12
,1
61
8,
23
1
8,
81
0
4,
12
9
4,
69
3
3,
08
1
3,
62
2
H
ig
h
S
ch
o
ol
A
ca
d
.
In
d
ex
71
9.
3
-2
.6


74
1.
3
-2
.8


73
1.
2
2.
0
74
1.
6
1.
1
P
ar
en
ts
h
av
e
B
A
0.
74
5
0.
01
8


0.
76
5
0.
01
0
0.
75
1
0.
01
0
0.
76
9
0.
00
9
P
ar
en
ts
’
In
co
m
e
¤
$3
0K
0.
19
5
-0
.0
13


0.
18
6
-0
.0
08
0.
20
3
-0
.0
10
0.
18
4
-0
.0
04
P
ar
en
ts
’
In
co
m
e
¥
$8
0K
0.
40
2
0.
04
4


0.
41
3
0.
03
4


0.
38
4
0.
04
7


0.
40
9
0.
04
0


G
ra
d
u
at
io
n
R
at
e
0.
74
1
0.
01
5
**
*
p
 
0.
01
;
**
p
 
0.
05
;
*
p
 
0.
1.
D
at
a
S
ou
rc
e:
U
C
O
P
in
d
iv
id
u
al
d
at
a,
P
re
-P
ro
p
2
0
9
(1
9
9
5
-9
7
);
P
o
st
-P
ro
p
2
0
9
(1
9
9
8
-2
0
0
0
).
V
ar
ia
b
le
s:
N
o
.
o
f
O
bs
er
va
ti
o
n
s
is
th
e
to
ta
l
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
st
u
d
en
ts
w
h
o
en
g
a
g
ed
in
a
ct
iv
it
y
in
d
ic
a
te
d
in
co
lu
m
n
h
ea
d
in
g
;
N
o
.
o
f
O
bs
./
N
o
.
o
f
H
S
G
ra
d
s
is
ra
ti
o
of
a
co
lu
m
n
’s
N
o.
of
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
to
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
u
b
li
c
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
o
l
g
ra
d
u
a
te
s
p
er
ye
a
r
in
C
a
li
fo
rn
ia
;
G
ra
d
u
a
ti
o
n
R
a
te
is
sh
a
re
of
en
ro
ll
ed
st
u
d
en
ts
th
at
gr
ad
u
at
ed
in
5
y
ea
rs
o
r
le
ss
;
H
ig
h
S
ch
oo
l
A
ca
d
.
In
d
ex
is
su
m
o
f
re
-s
ca
le
d
st
u
d
en
t’
s
S
A
T
I
sc
o
re
(0
to
6
0
0
sc
a
le
)
p
lu
s
re
-s
ca
le
d
st
u
d
en
t’
s
U
C
-a
d
ju
st
ed
h
ig
h
sc
h
o
ol
G
P
A
(0
to
4
0
0
sc
a
le
);
P
a
re
n
ts
h
a
ve
B
A
is
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
o
f
w
h
et
h
er
st
u
d
en
t
h
a
s
a
t
le
a
st
o
n
e
p
a
re
n
t
w
it
h
B
ac
h
el
or
D
eg
re
e
or
m
or
e;
P
a
re
n
ts
’
In
co
m
e
¤
$3
0
K
is
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
fo
r
w
h
et
h
er
p
a
re
n
ts
’
a
n
n
u
a
l
in
co
m
e
is
¤
$
3
0
,0
0
0
,
w
h
er
e
P
re
-P
ro
p
20
9
in
co
m
e
ar
e
in
fl
at
io
n
-a
d
ju
st
ed
to
P
os
t-
P
ro
p
2
0
9
le
ve
ls
;
P
a
re
n
ts
’
In
co
m
e
¥
$8
0
K
is
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
in
g
va
ri
a
b
le
w
h
et
h
er
p
a
re
n
ts
’
a
n
n
u
a
l
in
co
m
e
is
¥
$8
0,
00
0;
an
d
w
h
er
e
G
ra
d
u
a
te
d
d
en
ot
es
th
o
se
w
h
o
g
ra
d
u
a
te
d
in
5
ye
a
rs
o
r
le
ss
.
112
Table B.2: Estimates Using the Baseline Method for Under-Represented Minorities,
Whites and Asian Americans
Asian
URM White Amer.
POST 0.040*** 0.023*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
UC Berkeley -0.405*** -0.003 -0.095
(0.086) (0.089) (0.073)
UCLA -0.547*** -0.044 -0.078
(0.089) (0.089) (0.077)
UC San Diego -0.291** 0.320*** -0.061
(0.123) (0.100) (0.081)
UC Davis -0.553*** 0.189** -0.142**
(0.093) (0.086) (0.069)
UC Irvine -0.198* 0.043 -0.089
(0.104) (0.094) (0.067)
UC Santa Barbara -0.136 0.286*** -0.113
(0.090) (0.083) (0.086)
UC Santa Cruz 0.010 0.479*** 0.240***
(0.093) (0.086) (0.093)
Acad. Index 0.327*** 0.693*** 0.551***
(0.103) (0.101) (0.075)
UC Berkeley  Acad. Index 0.538*** 0.053 0.194**
(0.129) (0.118) (0.096)
UCLA  Acad. Index 0.766*** 0.119 0.165
(0.133) (0.120) (0.102)
UC San Diego  Acad. Index 0.413** -0.349*** 0.160
(0.178) (0.134) (0.110)
UC Davis  Acad. Index 0.722*** -0.174 0.290***
(0.144) (0.118) (0.098)
UC Irvine  Acad. Index 0.282* -0.022 0.179*
(0.162) (0.131) (0.095)
UC Santa Barbara  Acad. Index 0.236* -0.289** 0.224*
(0.142) (0.115) (0.126)
UC Santa Cruz  Acad. Index -0.024 -0.628*** -0.276*
(0.149) (0.121) (0.142)
Admitted to UC Berkeley 0.027** -0.002 0.022**
(0.013) (0.009) (0.009)
Admitted to UCLA or higher ranked 0.003 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.010)
Admitted to UC San Diego or higher ranked 0.005 0.039*** 0.014
(0.017) (0.009) (0.009)
Admitted to UC Davis or higher ranked 0.058*** 0.032*** 0.013
(0.017) (0.008) (0.014)
Admitted to UC Irvine or higher ranked 0.004 -0.013 0.018**
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Admitted to UC Santa Barbara or higher ranked -0.001 0.024** 0.044***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.017)
Admitted to UC Santa Cruz or higher ranked 0.048** 0.000 -0.027*
(0.022) (0.019) (0.016)
Initial Major Soc. Sci. 0.027*** 0.011** 0.031***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Initial Major Science -0.083*** -0.050*** -0.047***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant 0.443*** 0.186*** 0.294***
(0.063) (0.067) (0.047)
Family Background Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.045 0.046 0.061
*** p   0.01; ** p   0.05; * p   0.1.
Coefficient standard error in parentheses.
UC-Riverside is the omitted UC campus in these regressions.
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